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John Rogers, The Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry,
and Politics in the Age of Milton. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1996. Pp. xvi + 257. $39.95.
Reviewed by Reid Barbour
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
political affiliation of natural philosophy in seventeenth-century
England is one of the most hotly contested issues of modern
scholarship. The question of politics and science is made all the
more complex by virtue of the fact that seventeenth-century notions of
natural philosophy were no less conflictive and hybrid than the political
positions taken in the century of Stuart rule and civil war. John Rogers's
substantial, if debatable, contribution to the study of politicized science and
of naturalized politics focuses on five writers flourishing in the years
1649-1666, on the "vitalist movement" in natural philosophy, and on radical
notions of human agency and organization in mid-century English political
culture. His main argument is that vitalism prompted, supported, and
legitimized emerging "liberal" notions of autonomous agency, popular
sovereignty, gender egalitarianism, and (it is at times suggested) market
economy. A corollary to this main argument is that mid-century vitalist
liberalism experienced a "difficult birth"—one can see its struggles in the
contradictions and tensions of its poetics—and that eventually the vitalist
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movement failed to produce the very liberal politics that it appeared
ontologically to require.
In his opening chapter, Rogers distinguishes vitalism and its liberal
political imperative from the ironically convergent and oppressive ideologies
of Calvinism and Hobbesian materialism. According to Rogers, a midcentury heyday for monist vitalism afforded impetus and justification to
writers who, for all their apparent political differences, articulated radically
decentered notions of "self-moving matter" and "self-determination" (2, 5).
Whereas Calvinism and mechanism forestalled any such notion of
autonomous agency, vitalism, or "animist materialism," posited not just that
the soul and body were (in Milton's phrase) "one first matter all" but that
matter was pervaded by the pneumatic "power of reason and self-motion"
(1). According to Rogers, a belief in this animating energy—that is, in a
spirit once infused but now diffusive—tended to gravitate in its political
analogues against hierarchy and centralized authority and in the direction of
free agency and a leveled commonwealth. Mid-century analogies between
vitalism and liberalism were, moreover, decidedly secular: whatever the
stated religious commitments of the writers in question, the providential
God teetered perilously close in their rhetoric to oppressive kings—this,
despite the fact that vitalist writers commonly posit a divinity as well as a
materiality in the infused spirit.
Rogers's five writers are William Harvey, Gerrard Winstanley, Andrew
Marvell, John Milton, and Margaret Cavendish. As Rogers recognizes, the
staunchly royalist Harvey makes a difficult inaugural case for a vitalist
liberalism. Nonetheless, emphasizing Harvey's 1649 replacement of the heart
with blood itself as governor of the body, Rogers follows Christopher Hill
in arguing that whether or not the doctor liked it, his seriatim and
"conflicting answers to the question of sanguineous agency fall in line with
the two organizational discourses—authoritarian and liberal—that would
come to dominate the general consideration of causation and structure for
the remainder of the century" (18). The last author treated in the
book—Margaret Cavendish—is also emphatically royalist, but Rogers
concentrates in her case on the radical critique of gender inequality that
vitalism helps her to make.
Rogers's most obvious case for a liberal vitalism is Winstanley, his most
compelling, Marvell; indeed, these two authors are treated together in
chapter 2, with Marvell also the subject of chapter 3. Setting Winstanley's
prose next to Marvell's pastoral poetry, Rogers shows how each writer is
attracted to a notion of political vitalism—that is, to a revolution "by gentler
means" as natural as the growth of trees (53). Such a natural divinity avoids
the violence implicit in the war itself but also in the true leveler's rebellious
digging up of common lands. The problem, however, is that vitalism
renders human agents hopelessly passive, a conflict that makes Winstanley
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appear somewhat hapless but that produces the complex and ironic
emblematics of Marvell's greatest verse, especially in Upon Appleton House
and the mower poems. In these writers, questions about agency abound, not
least; "what is the point of political action in the face of a revolution
overseen and perhaps even controlled by a higher, inhuman power?" (69).
In chapter 3, Marvell's negotiations between the passive yet holy power of
a "viridescent revolution" (77) and the violent yet decisive sacrifices of war
are revisited in the poet's representations of the alternative between virginity
and marriage. At times, Marvell's sociology of pure vitalism (Rogers argues)
comes closer to feudalism than liberalism, which suggests that the politics of
science (like science itself) can involve extraordinary hybrids. Once again,
the problem with a vitalist politics is that it tends to yield "the impotence
of the individual virtuous soul, and virtuous body, to organize the
increasingly chaotic body politic" (102). Marvell suspects, that is, that one
needs God and a Hobbesian violence for that.
Of the two chapters on Milton, the first centers on the politics of
creation in Paradise Lost. Building on Walter Pagel's work on Francis
Glisson's De rachitide, Rogers reconsiders Milton's famous monism
(especially as expressed in Books 5 and 7 of Paradise Lost), his epic images of
"self-generating matter" and of creative fermentation, and the troubling dregs
left unregenerate in the chaos of Book 2. Rogers's argument is that the
ontological dilemmas of mid-century physics resemble and contribute to
Milton's struggle to advance—without demonizing—a politics of autonomy
and decentralization. The second chapter on Milton focuses on conflicting
models of causation in the final books of Paradise Lost—one divine and
authoritarian, the other natural and human. The argument of this chapter
is that Michael's account of history mediates between a melancholy farewell
to effective political agency and a residual hope that individuals have purpose
and self-control.
In each of these chapters, Rogers offers evocative and complex readings
of crucial passages; in each there is an intelligent assessment of the struggles
of legitimation in the rhetoric of radical thinking just after the Civil War.
But the book's argument is not always convincing, in large part because the
thesis about vitalism's link to liberalism is simply too formulaic and
arbitrary. Rogers expends an insufficient, and often belated, effort on careful
readings of key vitalist texts outside the purview of his politicized thesis—for
instance, of the works of Van Helmont. He offers little sense of the
complexities of the physics itself, indeed of the ontological mystery and rich
intellectual legacy with which such pneumatic notions as "spirit" confronted
writers of the period. A perfect example of this neglect is the belated,
misplaced, and rather thin treatment of Harvey's De generatione animalium
in the course of the book. But Rogers is just as sketchy early on about
Calvinism and Hobbesian materialism as he is about vitalistic monism: too
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often intellectual "movements" are reduced to character sketches, then
deployed in a thesis according to which vitalism produces radical liberal
politics, almost inevitably.
The inevitability of vitalism's production of liberal thought is another
problem with the book's thesis and rhetoric—at least if liberalism is
understood to comprise an autonomous individualism. At times, vitalism is
said to exert the same kind of deterministic "tug" on writers' texts that the
Calvinist God putatively exerted on their souls (14). Without question,
writers are not fully in charge of their own rhetoric or its reception. But
Rogers is unwilling to consider the possibility that a pneumatic physics
might lend support to a political ideal quite different from the one that he
chooses as his focus. For example, it has been convincingly argued by other
scholars that the pneumatic physics of Stoicism was just as likely to please
seventeenth-century supporters of a relatively unrestricted central authority
as it was to encourage radical opponents of such a power. One is prompted,
then, to ask of Rogers: if there is a politics to Harvey's and Cavendish's
vitalism, is it necessarily, willy-nilly, a betrayal of their royalism? Must a
natural philosophy claim only one political affiliation? In pursuit of his
thesis, Rogers admits but often marginalizes the commonplace associations
in the period between atomism, democracy, and the autonomous individual.
So it is that the book's argument slips and slides (a) from the notion that
matter is infused everywhere by spirit to (b) the notion (with divinity
conveniently dismissed from the picture) that matter is autonomous to (c)
the notion that matter means particulate matter. In a book that tends to set
aside the differences between the writers that it treats, it is ironic that
Rogers's slippery treatment of physical problems is symptomatic of the hard
and fast lines that he draws between intellectual "movements"—these, he
virtually reifies in what he calls a "dialectic," the theoretical basis of which
the book never explains. Rogers resists the notion that the transmission of
ideas in the seventeenth century is often hybrid and unformulaic. Thus, too
often in his argument, writers are compelled to think that which they
obviously would not at all wish to think; or writers betray or fail the logic
that leads straight from vitalism to liberalism. But maybe the physical and
political logics of the period are simply not that straight in the first place, a
point that at times he wonderfully manages, for instance, in his discussion
of Marvell and feudalism. By the end, however, liberalism has begged far
too many questions about the unquestionably fascinating transmission of the
chemical philosophy in wartime. And the liberal formula entails that there
are missed opportunities; in the first Milton chapter, for instance, Rogers is
so intent on equating Milton's physico-political stance with Satan's radical
claims for autonomy that he leaves undeveloped the ways in which a godly
vitalism might have helped the poet to mediate between theological and
political extremes.
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In sum: Rogers's is an engaging book in need of a more supple, less
reductive thesis. This other thesis would account for the complexities of
pneumatic physics, and of the politics that such a physics can prompt, and
be less doggedly committed to proving that vitalism tried (and not
surprisingly failed) to produce the liberal individual. Rogers's book is at its
best when it articulates those political and ontological questions haunting a
fine set of writers who struggled with the implications of the English Civil
War. But too often the book superimposes a ready and easy answer on the
very questions that it recreates so compellingly.

T5V

Harold Weber, Paper Bullets: Print and Kingship under
Charles II. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1996. Pp. X + 292. $39.95.
Reviewed by Stephan Flores
University of Idaho
Harold Weber's Paper Bullets presents a fascinating analysis of a rapidly
developing print industry and culture that promoted new representations of
Charles II and his subjects. Weber provides a rich account of how the
circulation and exchange of printed texts—particularly books, pamphlets, and
newspapers, written accounts of trials and political debate, as well as
published and unpublished manuscripts—became necessary not only to
narrating history, but constitutive of political practice under the restored
monarchy. Such texts are performative, and created significant problems and
possibilities for those—including Charles and a growing literate public—who
felt compelled to enter into the production and marketing of printed
materials. Printed discourse afforded both royalist and nonconformist
culture new opportunities for political influence, but the printed word also
subjected king and commoner to public consumption and opinion. Weber
shows that the press was instrumental to the king's efforts to exert his
authority. Yet Weber also demonstrates brilliantly how the body of the
king and the political health of the nation were profoundly refigured and
questioned anew, from dismay over the earliest Restoration political
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settlements to the tremendous outcry in print over the Popish Plot and the
Exclusion Crisis.
Weber begins by examining different narrative fictions concerning
Charles's body as evidence of conflicting perspectives on king and nation.
The first chapter compares romantic accounts of Charles's 1651 incognito
escape from Worcester, most of which celebrate the king's triumphant return
and ease anxiety over an exile's sudden but ultimately providential
restoration. Throughout the book, Weber reads various primary sources
closely and astutely; here he notes in detail how references to Providence
become emblematic of Charles's right to sovereignty and the nation's right
to a legitimate heir, so that past loss can be reinterpreted to prefigure the
king's sacred body and the nation's release from bondage into divine
protection. The miraculous transformation of defeat into victory is
demanded by Stuart myth, and these narratives enact Charles's public
vindication. Accounts of the battle at Worcester, however, betray unease,
not just in dealing with defeat but with the difficulty posed by emphasizing
Charles's heroism in a fight against his own people. After 1660, some
histories address this problem by redirecting Charles's valor against a single
scapegoat: Cromwell. But Weber notes that these narratives actually
redefine heroism: "Patience, not military prowess comes to describe
Charles's highest virtue" (39). Charles succeeds his father as a martyr to
patience, a true "King of Hearts" (40) whose love for his subjects cannot be
disguised.
In chapter 2, we learn how the king's divine body and potency are
promulgated through texts that recount his royal power to heal scrofula, the
"King's Evil." The king's touch became essential to Charles's self-presen
tation in elaborate public healing ceremonies. Weber then turns to consider
the notorious career of a popular Irish healer, Valentine Greatrakes, whose
visit to London in 1666 prompted controversy over the nature of healing.
Many satirized Greatrakes's pretensions, but some also wrote against
physicians, who were stigmatized by their professional and economic
self-interest as "rapacious...charlatans" (76). The medical community
eventually published literature that asserted its own scientific power at the
expense of popular belief in sacred healing. Such debate over who has
healing power or knowledge acquires much greater political significance later
in Charles's reign when Monmouth's supporters attempted to legitimate his
pretensions to the throne by proclaiming the Duke's healing powers. Yet
such efforts also risked exposing Monmouth to ridicule, and recalled the
vulgar notoriety generated by Greatrakes's mountebank charade. Weber
concludes that by 1726 "belief in the king's touch is little more than a form
of Jacobite nostalgia" (81), transforming the "monarch who would heal into
just another quack" (87).
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Chapter 3's provocative title, "The Monarch's Profane Body; 'His
scepter and his prick are of a length,'" signifies contemporary concerns that
recast Charles's sexual promiscuity as political impotence. Indeed, the king's
royal phallus was increasingly exposed to public critique through a series of
poems on affairs of state, most notably those inaugurated by Waller's
"Instructions to a Painter" (1665) as well as the famous opening lines to
Dryden's Absalom and Achitophel. Weber argues that Charles's identity as
pater patriae, father of his country, becomes ridiculed in such texts by
linking his "prodigious heterosexual appetites...[to] his effeminacy,
impotence, and homosexuality" (92). For example, the government's
conduct of the Second Dutch war, epitomized by the humiliating English
defeat in June 1667, serves as an occasion for the "Fourth Advice To a
Painter" to satirize Charles's "captive penis" (94) for ironically failing to
uphold the king's protective role as father and husband to the nation.
Moreover, supporters and opponents alike are alarmed as the king's
appetitive body is reproduced in manuscripts and widely disseminated.
Weber offers a thoughtful and incisive understanding of how the king's
sexual identity became created by and challenged political commentators who
found it difficult to imagine a monarch "both militarily vigorous and
constitutionally responsible" (105). In a play such as Sodom, the problem of
responsible male sexual vigor finally leads to homoerotic celebrations of male
solidarity founded upon a deep distrust and rejection of the female body.
Weber sustains his trenchant observations as his analysis of the press and
the language of censorship proceeds in the last two chapters. Chapter 4
focuses on the government's profound interest in regulating the press,
prompted by fears of public "levelling" discourse that threatened "the system
of rank and hierarchy that upheld social order" (133). The exchange of
unlicensed and unpublished literature in coffeehouses proved especially
worrisome, and such fears of unregulated and therefore seditious popular
discourse grew after the 1662 Licensing Act lapsed in June 1679. Still, during
the political crisis of 1678-1682, the press was recognized not only as a
"precipitating cause but as part of a potential solution" (170). The fifth
chapter evaluates the spectacular case of Stephen College, the "Protestant
Joiner" whose dramatic trial enables Weber to analyze how and why the
government sought to define and to discipline "authors" as primary agents
and representatives of an overweening "public." College is condemned to
execution as the ostensible author of the ballad "A Raree Show," and by his
example the truth of a conspiracy revealed in print is taken to be
self-evident. Yet Algernon Sidney's trial for supposedly treasonous views in
his unpublished private papers suggested that by the close of Charles's reign,
the government hoped to censor, in the words of Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys,
even the "imagination of a man's heart" (213).
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Paper Bullets is impressive: Weber's study offers an important, distinctive
contribution to current scholarship (e.g., see books just published by Laura
Rosenthal and Roger Lund) on the cultural significance of developments in
print and press, gender relations, literary property, and authorship.

Carol Barash, English Women's Poetryy 1649-1714:
Politics, Community, and Linguistic Authority. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. xii + 345. $55.00.
Reviewed by Claudia N. Thomas
Wake Forest University
Carol Barash's English Women's Poetry, 1649-1714 continues the important
work of recovering the sources, contexts, and traditions within which early
modern English women wrote. If Margaret Ezell's ground-hreaking The
Patriarch's Wife (1987) recovered a rich heritage of seventeenth-century
women's religious writings, Barash reminds us that following the Civil War,
women's writings were as often sanctioned by their political affiliations as by
their religious beliefs; or rather, that politics and religion were as inter
twined in women's lives as in men's. While scholars (including myself) have
tended to focus on women's problematic entrance into the mid-eighteenthcentury literary marketplace, their path obstructed by growing idealization
of maternity and domesticity, Barash reconstructs an era when women
writers imaged themselves as the community of loyal Stuart adherents.
Speaking with the authority of representative political stature, women
constructed themselves during the Interregnum as the longing but estranged
brides of their absent monarch. When that metaphor became problematic
after the Restoration, women adapted by centering their allegiance and praise
on the royal Stuart females. As Barash demonstrates, their devotion
empowered women who assumed for themselves the position of strength
they ascribed to their female rulers. That vantage point was endangered,
however, when emphasis on Queen Anne's maternity and emotional
vulnerability left female adherents without a clear position of authority from
which to speak.
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Barash commences her study by tracing a number of critical themes.
Like Ezell, who had to reconstruct the culture that sanctioned women's
authoritative speech in regard to religion, Barash rebuilds the volatile
cultural-political situation of England after the civil wars. Many scholars are
familiar with the flow of continental dramatic literature into England; not
so many seem cognizant of the extent to which women were influenced by
French and Italian writers, especially those clustered about the French court.
In these writers, Barash argues, women found an ideal of the femme forte, the
mythic heroine famed for noble deeds. While in The Excellence of Falsehood
(1991), Deborah Ross argued that French romances appealed to women
readers due to their focus on strong, demanding heroines, Barash elaborates
the political implications of these figures due to their association with the
French "warrior women" of the Fronde (33). English women adapted these
French models to create their own versions of femmes fortes protecting the
Stuart court against its opponents. English women also used traditional
representations of monarchy as embattled female chastity, and the myth of
monarchy as a mystical marriage between ruler and people, to sanction their
verse. When Katherine Philips, "the matchless Orinda," is read within these
contexts, her verses appear not "mere" pastorals but myths of female
communities guarding the Stuarts' honor.
Philips's device became
problematic after the Restoration, when the exclusive female friendships she
extolled in verse had less urgent political implications. While not
discounting the possible emotional significance such relationships may have
held for Philips, Barash demonstrates the continuing political usefulness of
the theme for Philips, and perhaps even more importantly following
publication of her poems, the potency of her "symbolization of gender,
language, and monarchy...for the women writers who followed her" (99).
Among Philips's contemporaries, Aphra Behn shared her political
sympathies but chose a public career instead of depending primarily on
manuscript circulation of her verse. Behn, moreover, dealt overtly in all of
her writings with sexual politics, questioning the state of war to which their
culture had apparently reduced men and women. Barash demonstrates that
similar preoccupations dominate Behn's political verse. In her libertine
poems, Behn intimates that women as well as men experience desire—indeed,
experience themselves as linguistic and erotic subjects rather than as objects.
In her political verse, Behn constructs Catherine of Braganza and Mary of
Modena as powerful figures whose erotic attractions are more effective than
kingly machismo in maintaining their subjects' loyalties. In such poems,
Behn adapted the femme forte tradition to "English debates about political
authority and the monarch's person or body" (144).
The final third of Barash's study elaborates Philips's and Behn's influence
on the Tory women poets who followed them. Anne Killigrew, too often
dismissed as the shadowy occasion for Dryden's elegy, emerges as an
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indisputably ambitious political writer. Killigrew and Jane Barker—a woman
of middling status who accompanied James's court into exile—both
transformed the salon-like and Catholic rituals surrounding Mary of Modena
into an image of female community potentially redemptive of their corrupt
nation. English Women's Poetry concludes with two chapters relating
Princess, later Queen, Anne to women poets. Killigrew and Barker had
invoked Mary of Modena's beauty as a source of power. During the reign
of William, Anne's supporters, including Mary, Lady Chudleigh, Sarah Fyge
Egerton, and Mary Astell described the princess as a warrior, insinuating her
superior claim to the throne. When Anne became queen, however, cultural
focus shifted to her inability to bear a surviving heir. To redirect the
metonymic association between a ruler's physical body and authoritative
potency, Anne's adherents described her as the mother of her nation, an
image with disastrous consequences for female poets. Instead of as a femme
forte, Anne was increasingly celebrated for her domestic role and emotional
responses.
By the time Anne Finch published her volume of poems in 1713, the
idealized female community so political in the verse of earlier women writers
was becoming an ever-more-secluded and depoliticized domain. Read from
the perspective of Barash's study. Finch's poetry becomes startlingly political
partly by suggesting her despair of an ongoing role for women poets in the
political arena. All the traditions Finch inherited from Philips, Behn, and
her other precursors are present but transmuted into images of internal exile
after the heart-breaking revolution of 1688. As Barash observes, these images
of seclusion, amidst a natural world further drained by editing of most
political significance, were precisely the source of Finch's appeal to later
poets, to whom her verse appeared appropriately feminine as well as
pastoral. Hopefully, English Women's Poetry, 1649-1714 will restore the
political context as well as the complex derivation of Finch's verse, while
recalling for our renewed attention her strong Tory foremothers.

T3V
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Laura J. Rosenthal, Playwrights and Plagiarists in Early
Modern England. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1996. Pp. X + 257. $39.95.
Reviewed by Margaret J. M. Ezell
Texas A&M University
I became convinced that my understanding of plagiarism was not in sync
with that of my students when I spent a lengthy session with a young man
who earnestly explained to me how his views on The Tempest exactly
matched those of Frank Kermode's, down to the very word order: "but
that's exactly what I thought," he announced triumphantly, "it's not my
problem that Kermode thought so, too. He doesn't own 'and' and 'the' does
he?" The problem of who "owns" words, obviously, continues to be a lively
one and in Laura J. Rosenthal's intriguing study of the charges of plagiarism
made against Restoration and early eighteenth-century dramatists her task is
less to assign guilt or blame than to explore the significance of gender,
profession, and perceptions of property among writers.
Rosenthal's main task is to consider the nature of the charges of
"plagiarism" during the period surrounding the 1710 copyright act, to
investigate whether such accusations have a different significance when
directed towards women writers and when directed towards "elite amateurs
and "Grub Street hacks." Her conclusions point strongly towards different
strategies used by different classes of authors to establish their authority as
the owner of texts and to clear themselves from charges that they lack
originality. "I do not put the word 'plagiarism' in quotation marks most of
the time, but perhaps those quotations [sic] marks should be imagined,"
states Rosenthal in her introduction; "part of my purpose here is to
defamiliarize Restoration and early eighteenth-century intertextuality and to
question differences between plagiarism, imitation, adaptation, repetition, and
originality" (10). This ambitious project certainly succeeds in problematizing
our assumptions about the intersections of gender, commercial authorship,
and literary property through five chapters focusing on individual dramatists,
male and female, who were charged with "plagiarism": Dryden, Behn, the
Duchess of Newcastle, Colley Gibber, and Susanna Centlivre. Unlike Laura
Rosenthal, I will, however, wish she had preserved the quotation marks
when using terms such as "plagiarism," because while her study is very
imponant in causing us to reassess our understanding of the ways in which
authorship was defined by the writer and his/her critics in Restoration and
early eighteenth-century literary culture, it is still troubling to me in its
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presentation of the way we talk about earlier practices and create our models
of past cultures not our own.
In Rosenthal's assessment of the practice of accusing a writer of
plagiarism, it wasn't so much what one "stole" (or perhaps repeated) which
created the charge, but rather who did the act and for what audience. For
women writers, who, given the definitions of the day had functional control
over property but not ownership, the charge appears to Rosenthal to have
been the attempt to deny them "cultural authority" rather than an academic
concern over the number of words transferred. In her investigations of
Maigaret Cavendish and Aphra Behn, Rosenthal finds that class overrides
gender: for the Duchess, "Originality, or the creation of new worlds rather
than the conquest of extant ones, provides an alternative space and an
alternative economy of authorship for elite women, potentially free from
penetration and appropriation by men" (104); in Cavendish, whose plays,
of course, were never performed but instead were read, Rosenthal finds
successful strategies for women writers who claim authority through
originality, "in the Hobbesian sense of property as both an extension and
realization of the self and at the same time as something deeply and bitterly
contested" (104). For the professional writer Behn, in contrast, Rosenthal
feels that she was never able to "position herself as an owner of literary
property" (105) but was continually labeled as a plagiarist throughout her
professional career, while those who plagiarized from her—most notably
Thomas Southerne—today get their versions promoted on the covers of her
texts (warning to drama enthusiasts: the bulk of this chapter is devoted not
to Behn's plays, but to the appropriation of Oroonoko). "Gendered positions
of alienability have consequences for authorship as well as sexuality,"
concludes Rosenthal about Behn, seeing her "deconstructing the gendered
opposition between those who can alienate sexual property and those who
cannot" (131). In the case of The Rover, "Behn by implication deconstructs
the opposition (informed by both class and gender) between elite, amateur
economies of privilege and the professional circulation of texts for money"
(131).
Although Dryden, too, repeatedly faced charges of plagiarism, Rosenthal
believes in part because of his class "cross-dressing" (both a wage-earning
professional writer but also attempting to represent himself as part of the
amateur "elite"), it was Colley Gibber who "became the biggest plagiarist of
the Augustan age" (203). Gibber earned this dubious crown away from Mary
Fix and the female wits, "because he exploited liminal gender and economic
positions that advanced his career but nevertheless cast suspicion on his
ability to inhabit the position of owner" (203). Thus, as Rosenthal points
out, "there was...no exemplary figure who escaped all suspicion of plagiarism
through masculine authority: the search for Aphra Behn's privileged brother
remains just as futile as the search for Shakespeare's sister" (244). In
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conclusion, Rosenthal feels that we need to reexamine more closely the
specifics of the charges of plagiarism, to contextualize them in the cultural
situation of the development of professional authorship and to rethink the
position of "originality" in terms of gender issues.
Playwrights and Plagiarists in Early Modern England thus raises important
and interesting questions which challenge us to reconsider both familiar and
obscure writers during this period as being part of a developing commercial
culture. It does not, however, "defamiliarize" plagiarism: if anything, the
treatment of issues concerning copyright, hack writing, and "elite" literary
culture blur the distinctions between the way we understand those terms
today and the material culture of authorship during this important historical
period. Although Rosenthal positions the copyright act of 1710 as being of
central importance in changing the perception of authorship, her representa
tion of the Act itself is confined to a lengthy footnote citing other sources,
with the statement, "before the eighteenth century, authors did not generally
hold the copyrights to their own texts" (2): this is certainly true, but it is
the equivalent of saying that before 1900, few people used microwaves to
cook. The Act of Queen Anne was brought about by pressures from
booksellers, not authors, not to protect authors but to consolidate the power
of the booksellers; it certainly did not affect radical change in practice, nor
I would argue in perception, and the issues of the ownership of literary
property was even more publicly and hotly debated later in the century in
Tonson v. Collins (1760), Millar v. Taylor (1769) until copyright as we know
it finally became enforced through Donaldson v. Becket (1774). While seeking
to defamiliarize plagiarism, Rosenthal's study perpetuates the paradigm of the
individual author-centered literary history which ignores the other actors in
the process, most noticeably the booksellers and the printers. You will look
in vain in the index for references to Dryden's, Behn's, Cavendish's, or
Gibber's publishers—Dunton makes it into a footnote, but there is no trace
of Lintot, Tonson, or the individuals who actually prosecuted the legal cases.
Instead, you have the representation of literary culture as author-controlled,
author-centered, whereas historians of print such as Marjorie Plant cheerfully
acknowledge that during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, with
very few exceptions such as Pope, the author was the least important person
in the process of publication.
In the same way that literary culture is represented as being dominated
by the author to the exclusion of booksellers and printers ^^ou'll have to
read the sources listed in the footnotes to obtain that information), the
representation of "elite" versus commercial literary culture blurs the material
practices of amateur literary life under a blanket of vague, but evocative
terms. For example, "Cavendish wrote as an elite amateur, fashioning her
plays for a courtly audience; Behn earned her living as a professional,
associating (like Dryden) with other professionals...and amateurs who
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associating (like Dryden) with other professionals...and amateurs who
nevertheless understood the difference between her position and theirs" (105).
What is an "elite amateur ecomony" of authorship? What is a "courtly
audience"? In this study, the only amateur authors appear to be those who
have titles, and their audiences are apparently courtiers. What about the
amateur authors who were not "elite" such as Cavendish's contemporaries,
such as the Yorkshire gentleman Thomas Meriton, who penned The
Wandering Lover which was acted by himself and friends? What about the
plays produced by students at the two universities, often not printed? What
about literary activity by women such as Marie Burghope, the vicar's
daughter, or Elizabeth Singer Rowe, who published without profit, or indeed
the literary productions of those living in Scotland? How do these authors
fit within the dichotomy of elite amateur and courtly audience/Grub Street
professional and commercial reader? Indeed, the whole issue of the nature
of amateur authorship is elided in the assumption that amateur literary
production was the same in practice as professional except for the motive,
which ignores literary life in the provinces, as well as erasing coterie circles
and their apparently very different perception of literary "property."
Thus, I would urge you to read Rosenthal's study for its provocative
close-readings of individual authors and the insults they faced. Rosenthal has
brought an "original" series of questions to bear on issues and events that
traditional literary histories have tended to ignore. If you are interested,
however, in the larger social history of the professionalization of authorship
or the history of literary culture in all its material practices as it existed
before copyright was clearly established in the 1770s, you would do well to
consult the footnotes of this study instead of relying on Rosenthal's
generalized picture of it.
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Donald C. Mell, ed., Pope, Swift, and Women Writers.
Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1996. Pp. 252.
$39.50.
Reviewed by Louise K. Barnett
Rutgers University
Donald Mell has assembled a group of lively essays on a timely subject, the
relationship of women writers to Pope and Swift. The women writers
discussed range from Augustan contemporaries who knew Pope or Swift to
present-day scholars and even the twentieth-century writer Dorothy Parker.
Augmenting this full spectrum, two contributions discuss famous poems in
which women have central roles, "The Rape of the Lock" and "Cadenus and
Vanessa."
Mell's cautiously-phrased preface and introduction exhibits an awareness
that the subject is potentially explosive: his opening sentence refers to
"intense hostilities in women readers and feminists" aroused by Pope and
Swift's "allegedly unsympathetic treatment of women" (9). A few pages
later, adverse reaction becomes narrowed to "feminist hostility" (15) as if
only a "feminist" (whatever this term might mean in reference to eighteenthcentury writers) might object to negative depictions of women. For the
most part, however, the essays collected here do not participate in the kinds
of reactions the introduction invokes. Their valuable elucidation of the
relationship of particular eighteenth-century women writers to Swift and
Pope is preponderantly outside the framework of praise and blame that
colors, and in some instances deforms, much other work in this area.
The triptych of essays on Pope and women poets adumbrates variations
on the model of famous male and aspiring female: how Pope's powerful
influence encouraged one woman writer and discouraged another, and how
the third dissociated herself from his masculine vision. Caryn Chaden's
examination of the first writer, Mary Leapor, delineates the most
conventional kind of relationship between male mentor and female disciple:
Pope looms large in Leapor's work, but his influence is modified by her
different experience as a woman, most tellingly when Chaden contrasts
Leapor's "Epistle to Artemisia" with Pope's to Dr. Arbuthnot. No one
would have suggested to Pope what was said to Leapor: "Go, ply your
Needle: You might earn your Bread" (37). Chaden is most helpful when
she illuminates this kind of deflection. Valerie Rumbold's "The Poetic
Career of Judith Cowper: An Exemplary Failure?" is an insightful study of
a more pernicious form of influence, one that can explain why many women
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did not pursue careers as poets. Rumbold persuasively asserts that Pope's
male model of poetic genius "was at odds with any self-image [Cowper]
could comfortably maintain" in spite of his encouragement of her writing
(48-9). Ultimately, Rumbold concludes, Cowper was unable to "identify and
challenge the terms of her exclusion" (65). The final essay in this group of
three, Linda Veronike Troost's discussion of Mary Chandler's "Description
of Bath" (1733), reveals a woman who poses a "contemplative-feminine
power" against an "active-masculine force" (81-2). All three essays on
women poets refer to biographical data, but it seems particularly significant
here: Chandler ran a millinery shop from the age of eighteen and only
published her first verse in her forties. While she did not have the
opportunity of making her living in a literary milieu as Pope did, her long
years as a businesswoman must have given her self-confidence. When she
came to write in maturity, she was able to articulate a feminine ideal in the
teeth of the male definition of the poet and poetry. This same thrust is
apparent in Barbara McGovern's thoughtful analysis of epilogues that Pope
and Anne Finch wrote to "The Tragedy of Jane Shore," one a standard
castigation of the promiscuous heroine and the promiscuous actress who
played her, the other a criticism of the double standard. Gender perspective
is an obvious presence here. McGovern also stresses the parallels between
the two poets, both marginalized by their Catholicism. Here as elsewhere
in the volume, comparison only emphasizes how much more marginal the
particular woman was than Pope.
Turning to Swift, a pair of essays on his relationship to Delariviere
Manley explores a much different relationship between famous male poet
and lesser female counterpart than any exemplified by Pope. Manley was a
fellow political satirist who for a time worked closely with Swift. What is
most arresting in Melinda Alliker RabB's treatment is the way male critics
have slighted Manley's role, downgrading her friendship with Swift and
belittling her contributions to the Examiner. Rabb finds that Swift's
Examiner piece on the Harley stabbing is both unconvincing and ineffectual
in healing the breach between Harley and Bolingbroke whereas Manley
handled the episode in a politic fashion, making the rival ministers appear
equally heroic. Carole Fabricant's "The Shared Worlds of Manley and
Swift" could serve as a perceptive concluding statement for many of the
issues raised elsewhere in this collection: the gender vulnerabilities that
plague even the most talented women (Manley's seduction and pregnancy
recalls Cowper's many childbirths) and the automatic relegation to secondclass status. Although Fabricant intends for her quotations of Swift's
comments on Manley to document affinity, they more tellingly voice the
casual condescension that accompanies his sympathy. He hopes that the
political masters he shares with Manley "will do something for the poor
woman," a token for Fabricant that Swift thought of "his own dependency
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and vulnerability" (158). Perhaps: this and other statements suggest to me
that Swift would never equate his own situation with Manley's, no matter
how appropriate. Fabricant is most eloquent and convincing in considering
Manley apart from Swift, reading her life as exemplifying a general female
experience of "isolation, instability, and disruption" (164) and analyzing the
way she "feminizes Tory ideology" (172).
Although it is technically off the subject of women writers, Claude
Rawson's "Rage and Raillery and Swift: The Case of Cadmus and Vanessa"
documents a "self-regarding obliquity" and "self-vaunting" (189, 191) that
challenges the text's ostensible purpose of praising a particular woman.
Nora P. Crow's "Swift and the Woman Scholar," a useful review of
women's research, fittingly concludes this volume by invoking the common
concerns of all scholars. "In this enterprise," she writes, "We are all
partners" (236).

Robert E Gleckner, Gray Agonistes Thomas Gray and
Masculine Friendship.
Baltimore, London: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1997. Pp. x + 231. $45.00/
£37.00.
Reviewed by Richard G. Williams
Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University
This is the season for "outing" the Etonian "Quadruple Alliance" of Walpole,
Gray, West and Ashton. Following Timothy Mowl's belaboring, in an
uneven popular Walpole biography, of W. S. Lewis for failure to identify
what Mowl posits as Walpole's defining homosexual relationship with Lord
Lincoln (which Lewis openly discussed but felt that, while almost certainly
true, proof was lacking), we now have a sensitive demonstration of how to
present male sexual relationships in this beautifully crafted study of Gray and
especially of his relationship with Richard West, his Etonian schoolfriend.
Gleckner's work is a "double narrative of Gray's life and career" (53),
aimed at charting his relationship with Milton—his confidence-sapping
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haunting by Milton's ghost—and that with West, a loving but uneasy covert
homosexual liaison, the two central springs triggering his poetic genius. His
expectation of its reception as "something like a psychobiography" is
justifiable, although it reads more truly as the "poetic autobiography" of
Gray that he aims to present in his intention to "illuminate not so much
Gray's life as Gray's life in his poetry" (16). It is also a classic, delicately
nuanced demonstration of the art of close reading, the more impressive
because of the deliberately falsified text of Gray's correspondence with West
and the skill with which Gleckner unpicks this conundrum, drawing
distinctions where evidence may or may not lead to light on the Gray-West
relationship. While his insights may not be so new, he justifies his claim to
have based his reading on "deeper excavation into Gray's career and life"
(191).
Gleckner provides the reader with an excellent guide to the literature on
Gray, focusing on the nature of previous readings of the poet and his works.
He is closest in his reading to Ketton-Cremer, biographer of Gray and
Walpole, who wrote under the guidance of Walpole's editor Lewis (yet
further evidence that Lewis was at ease with the homosexual proclivities of
Walpole's circle). All the important literature on Gray is even-handedly and
fairly reviewed.
Gleckner's view of Gray's literary indebtedness is narrower than that of
some, focusing intensively on his debt to and unease with Milton. We are
presented with a comprehensive account of Gray's influences, not excluding
the unraveling of Gray's obfuscation of his Miltonic sources and inspirations.
Nor does he neglect other sources, an acknowledgment of the effectiveness
of Gray's "extraordinary verbal memory" (79). The author shares fully
Gray's own scholarly, wide-ranging literacy in English and classical literature
and deploys it with illuminating insight. Gray's sense of guilt at Milton's
presumption and his own in attempting to emulate him is richly docu
mented, both in a chapter on the Miltonic background and in the
expositions of the poems themselves. Gleckner analyses, with great clarity
and with control of the dangers of distortion through his method. The Bard
as "the pinnacle of Gray's agonistic relationship with Milton:... that powerful
and ultimately heart-wrenching prelude to the end of his repressed (or
displaced) subtextual autobiography of his poetic self" and demonstrates his
struggle to complete it as "both a climactic and pivotal point in Gray's
career" (88).
Memorably, Gleckner produces a convincing original
interpretation of the Cat ode as "Gray's first sustained attempt to put Milton
in his place" (153), his attempt at a smaller-scale account of the Fall, finishing
his analyses with Gray's firm rejection of Milton in The Progress of Poesy.
For the author, "the Gray-West correspondence is...an interpsychic
scripting of their deepest selves, their mutual homosexual desires and the
fears deriving therefrom, replete with precisely the same private fantasies
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Gray's poetry dramatically plays out in his poetic imagination" (18), They
exchanged not only correspondence, but also poetic offerings, some in Latin,
some in English, most of them sharing not only friendship and love but also
a deep knowledge of classical Latin literature. He traces with sureness and
delicacy the intimacy of the relationship and shows its enrichment of Gray's
work. The Ode to Spring, sent to West before Gray knew that he had died,
precedes a sequence of major poems unleashed by the emotions of the
bereavement, with West's presence so very evident therein, especially in the
Elegy. Paradoxically the identification with Milton becomes even closer, the
death of West seen as paralleling that of Milton's friend Diodati, "his own
self-dedication literally born out of the ashes of West's death" (119). One
further service that Gleckner does is the inclusion of the full text of some of
West's less readily available poetic output; indeed, in some ways, this is also
a study of West.
Both strands—the Miltonic and that of the West relationship—overlap in
the figure of Walpole, who fills a more minor and malign role for Gleckner
than perhaps was true, though Walpole is not central to this study. Indeed,
we have the suggestion that West tried "to forestall Gray's 'fall' or disgrace
at the hands of a 'satanic' Horace Walpole" (49), not knowing that Walpole
would be responsible for publishing Gray's work. He blames Walpole in
part for Mason's manipulation of Gray's biography. Nowhere is the quarrel
between Gray and Walpole at Reggio more than glanced at, no hint here to
confirm or deny Mowl's dubious hypothesis that Walpole staged the quarrel
to get Gray out of the way to indulge his infatuation with Lincoln. That so
crucial an event in Gray's life gets so little consideration when so much else
is focused on Gray's inner life is an odd comment on Gleckner's singleness;
one would wish the author to tackle Gray's relationship with Walpole,
especially with the continued lack of a modern scholarly biography of the
latter.
Mason memorialized Gray under Walpole's mentorship, trying to please
him by a work that would add luster to Gray's reputation. Walpole was
cutting about authors who attempted and failed at such a task, but it was
Walpole who guided the all too willing Mason in editorial decisions, not
even omitting advice on the destruction of Gray's and West's letters after his
"processing" of them—a curious view from one so keen to preserve his own
correspondence for posterity. Gleckner's account of Mason's mode of
working on his Gray Memoirs constitutes a comprehensive account of the
nature of the problem created for scholars attempting to study Gray in
depth—his description of Mason as "a version of a paper shredder working
at full throttle" (77) may jar in tone in his elegant text but is entirely
justified. Gleckner's reconstruction of the correspondence between the two
is riveting in its own right, with sensitive, reasonable and far-reaching results
in which he signals effectively his view of the limits of fairness of
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interpretation while still retaining a sense of how far it might be possible to
interpret certain aspects.
Gleckner conjures out of Gray's poetry a sense of looking forward to the
poetry of the Romantic period, especially in discussion of The Bard. By
fusing the Miltonic aspects of Gray's poetry with his deep despair at the
thought of succeeding in emulating Milton (and the complicated sense of
disaster seen in his wish to emulate Milton's presumption), and by placing
these alongside Gray's agony over his guilty love for West and its triggering
of his greatest verse, he sets Gray clearly in a transition between the
Augustan emulation of the classic poets of both Greece and Rome and of
England's golden age of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries on the
one hand and the more complex and personal joys and agonies of Romantic

Betty A. Schellenbeig, The Conversational Circle Re
reading the English Novel, 1740-1775. Lexington: The
University Press of Kentucky, 1996. Pp. x + 165.
$34.95.
Reviewed by Barbara Ching
The University of Memphis
Starting from an elegantly concise analysis of the mid-eighteenth-century
ideal of sociability, Betty Schellenberg brings forth a set of novels she terms
fictions of "the conversational circle." In these novels, a harmonious
domestic group supersedes the more familiar plot of the individual in conflict
with society. Eschewing the type of adventures, romances, and linear plots
that advance the middle-class hero, novels of the conversational circle
"circumscrib[e]...socially threatening individualistic desire in a plot structure
that models a community of consensus as the ideal unit from which a stable
society is constructed" (4). In particular, Schellenberg explores how the
novel of the conversational circle reinscribes feminine values and desires into
traditional models of patriarchal authority. From the beginning, she
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contrasts her narrative model to that of critics such as Watt and Bakhtin
whose preferred novels have emphasized the progressive emergence of the
bourgeoisie. She focuses instead on later, largely non-canonical novels by
established male authors (Fielding, Richardson, and Smollett), or by
protegees of these men (Sarah Fielding and Sarah Scott) to argue that the
conversational circle was used as both a structural and thematic element in
the mid-century novel. Such a grouping allows many valuable insights into
the early novel and into scholarship in this field, and allows Schellenberg to
live up to the claim (in her subtitle) that she is re-reading the eighteenthcentury novel as a whole. In fact, she demonstrates that the novels of the
conversational circle teach alternate ways to read novels, substituting an
invitation "into the novel's intimate circle" for the familiar model of reader
identification with an isolated protagonist (21).
Schellenberg's prose admirably replicates the "privileging of the language
of consensus over witty debate" advocated by her subject matter (5),
although I must confess that I would have appreciated more witty sallies.
The two introductory chapters are exemplary statements of the book's
purpose and design, and each chapter devoted to a specific novel balances a
detailed reading with development of the overall argument. Because
Schellenberg is viewing the novels from a new angle, she has something fresh
to say about all of them. While not observing strict chronological order, the
analysis of each novel advances the story of the rise and fall of fictional
conversational circles. She frames the story with a discussion of two novels
by Sarah Fielding. Her reading of David Simple (1744) argues that the novel
starts out as a typically linear individualist quest that optimistically
transforms itself into a conversational circle; indeed, as Schellenberg notes.
Fielding concludes with the claim that every community could realize such
ideal harmony with proper submission to the greater good. Nevertheless,
Schellenberg draws out repressed forces, such as economic dependency and
the need to exclude conflict, which later undermine the circle. The
penultimate chapter, on Fielding's Volume the Last (1753), thus stresses how
David Simple's circle of friends (particularly its young generation), already
inherently weakened by its artificially-created inexperience at recognizing and
dealing with disruption, is further undermined by the economic power of
ruthless outsiders. Most interesting in this chapter is Schellenberg's
discussion of Fielding's attempts to shift her reader's identification from the
male-centered circle she once advocated to the more worldly-wise voice of
her narrator.
In between these framing chapters, Schellenberg traces the other novelists'
attempts to expound on Fielding's early optimism and head off her later
pessimism. The chapter on Pamela Part II (1741) is particularly strong.
Immediately following the analysis of David Simple, Schellenberg
convincingly argues that this novel thematizes the very "unreadability" that
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most critics have lamented: "Richardson's text...has gone to literally great
lengths to arrive at this...complete frustration of the desire for a tensiondriven plot" (49). Thus the next chapter presents Richardson's Sir Charles
Grandison (1753-54) as the culminating achievement of the novel of the
conversational circle: Richardson not only allowed his readers' insights to
influence his portrayal of his hero, he also framed that portrayal with a
female narrator (Harriet Byron) whose feminine virtues allow Grandison to
publicly exemplify the truly good man. In contrast to Grandison's wide
circle of influence, Schellenberg next reads Fielding's Amelia (1751) as an
example of an excessively private circle since the ideal woman at its center
serves only to enclose her husband in a rural retreat. Likewise, Schellenberg
argues (rather literally) that Scott's Millenium Hall (1762) and Smollett's The
Expedition of Humphry Clinker {1777) create inviable circles, the one by its
exclusion of the masculine, and the other by its enshrinement of an old
masculine order—at the end, the only couple young enough to reproduce
itself at Brambleton Hall is headed by a bastard. I wonder how the inclusion
of Scott's continuation of Millenium Hall, The History of Sir George Ellison
(1766) would have altered this emphasis on sterility?
The concluding chapter raises interesting questions that Schellenberg
herself does not pose. Arguing that within the history of the novel, these
books represent "roads not taken because their claim to be descriptive...was
quickly felt to be prescriptive and sterile, untrue to the realities of individual
and social experience" (135), Schellenberg seems to suggest that the novel of
the conversational circle has simply vanished. But is it not possible that in
other stages of the novel's history, the very types of novelists Schellenberg
seeks out, marginal or well-enough established to take experimental risks,
have made an effort to re-invent or revive the fiction of the conversational
circle? (The novels of Ivy Gompton Burnett come to mind). Nevertheless,
Schellenberg, by limiting her study to the dates in question, describes well
how the eighteenth-century novel participated in the ideology of sociability
and social conservatism. The fact that there well may be more to say only
indicates how successful this initial exploration is.
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Robert J. Griffin, Wordsworth's Pope: A Study in
Literary Historiography. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni
versity Press, 1995). Pp. xii + 190. $49.95.
Reviewed by Jack Lynch
The University of Pennsylvania
Griffin's topic in this ambitious and polemic work is Wordsworth's Pope,
and the former's productive misreadings of the latter. More than describing
a simple rejection of Pope, Griffin acutely points out the degree to which
Romanticism was inescapably under Pope's spell: he shows that Pope was
in fact an important source of the very ideas he was accused of lacking, and
although he became the Romantics' whipping boy, he also provided them
with many of their central images and themes. Romantic relations to Pope
were deeply conflicted. Griffin argues, and here he is at his best. The
development of this insight, however, with its reliance on Bloom's Anxiety
of Influence, will likely leave many readers cold. I confess I remain among
the unconverted when it comes to the arguments about repression and
CEdipal conflicts.
The book is about more than meets the eye: Pope's name is often used
expansively for a kind of poetry, just as Wordsworth becomes a representa
tive of his age. But what "Pope" means is left frustratingly vague. Does he
represent craft.'—heroic couplets?—urbanity?—moral or didactic verse?—sat
ire.'—the man in his private character? Griffin seems to mean them all by
turns. The words "refinement" and "classical" appear prominently, but their
reductiveness merely begs the question: the larger sense remains unclear.
Dryden, for instance, sometimes stands in the Popean tradition of
refinement, sometimes in the previous age's more fiery tradition. Swift is
missing almost entirely from the discussion, which is a serious problem; he
shares much with Pope, and yet he fits poorly into Griffin's thesis. As Paul
Fussell has challenged, "I dare you to find anything 'Neoclassical' in Swift."
Chapter 1, on how the Wartons and Young established a new aesthetics
which used Pope as a foil, is the best in the book. In the second chapter the
argument is merely recapitulated and mechanically applied to the early
nineteenth century, especially Francis Jeffrey. Chapter 3, "Wordsworth's
Pope," is an extended close reading of several passages in Wordsworth,
particularly his little-studied translation of Virgil and his 1815 "Essay,
Supplementary to the Preface." The paucity of the passages examined,
however, leaves one wishing for a more comprehensive study of Pope's
influence.
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If Wordsworth's Pope were simply about Wordsworth's Pope, these first
three chapters would at least sketch the outlines of such an argument. But
the larger thesis that appears in hints throughout the book takes center stage
in the fourth chapter ("Mirror and Lamp"), which claims to provide a new
definition of Romanticism itself, an alternative to the story told by M. H.
Abrams. When he "defines Romanticism...negatively as a phenomenon that
is intimately bound up in what it dislikes" (26), Griffin takes on a much
bigger task, and therefore lays himself open to more substantial criticism.
This chapter's attack on Abrams's thesis as "an untenable generalization"
(114) seems out of place, or at least out of proportion. Here Griffin's own
thesis disappears almost entirely, and Pope is mentioned only in passing.
More to the point, though, however influential Abrams was in shaping
Romantic criticism, he is hardly the avatar of orthodoxy he is made out to
be. Like other great critical syntheses of the 1950s (such as Frye's Anatomy
of Criticism), The Mirror and the Lamp is still essential reading, but it has
received so much scrutiny over the years that everyone is now aware of its
oversimplifications and exclusions. And Griffin's accusations aimed at
Abrams—charges of selective reading and twisting data to fit a simple
narrative—can easily be turned back on himself. The pot is too quick to call
the kettle procrustean.
True, it is difficult to judge the truth or falsity of a definition: definitions
are not right or wrong so much as they are more or less useful. But Griffin's
definition is erected on too narrow a foundation to be as powerful as he
asserts. His Romanticism arises from the opposition of Spenser, Shakespeare,
and Milton to a misread Pope, but the role of Continental thought is never
explored—it is a Romanticism with no room for Rousseau or Goethe. In
discussing only verse and criticism, it is limited not only to a few genres but
to a few writers: the Wartons, Young, Jeffrey, and Wordsworth are
discussed at length, but even such major figures as Byron ("Better to err with
Pope than shine with Pye") are neglected. More unexpected in a work on
Romanticism in the middle 1990s is the implication that the familiar five and
a half male poets make up the canon of English Romanticism. It is not for
want of apropos material by women. Claudia Thomas, for instance, has
traced women's ambivalent reactions to Pope into the 1790s, and yet
Alexander Pope and His Eighteenth-Century Women Readers is mentioned only
(albeit approvingly) in a single footnote. In an even broader sense, his
Romantic literary history is a hermetically sealed affair, with reference only
to other literary history. It has no relation to the French Revolution, to
government reform, or to Britain's commerce with its growing empire.
Insofar as this is a book about Wordsworth and Pope, such omissions are
perhaps justified; insofar as it addresses the nature of Romanticism, they
make for a strangely unbalanced account.
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The "Conclusion, with thoughts on method in literary historiography"
is an attempt to answer some of these objections. The extended apologia,
however, betrays too much self-consciousness and hand-wringing over the
place of psychoanalysis in literary history, the place of literary history in
theory, and the place of theory in criticism. He takes on, for instance, the
question of "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" factors in literature, and finds a
psychologically informed literary history the perfect synthesis of the two
(138-41). But I think "history" means something more than, or at least
different from, the simple diachrony that Griffin believes rescues him from
dry formalism.
Wordsworth's Pope, however, is a bold effort. Like all ambitious works,
it opens itself to qualification. Everyone who reads it will find many things
to disagree with and many frustrating oversimplifications: Griffin's reach has
certainly exceeded his grasp. Still, the book is challenging, especially in the
early chapters, and it deserves attention for its willingness to take Pope
seriously as a ghost haunting Romanticism. In this respect it is a salutary
corrective to the overemphasis on the rupture between Romanticism and its
predecessors, damaged only by Griffin's desire to stretch his argument
further than it is willing to go.

T3V

David Hill Radcliffe, Edmund Spenser. A Reception
History. Columbia: Camden House, 1996. Pp. xiii +
239. $49.95.
Reviewed by Sayre N. Greenfield
University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg
One would not expect a history of one poet's critical fortunes to make such
a lively tale and have such broad pertinence, but David Radcliffe's study of
Spenser's reception throughout four centuries achieves both. His readable,
witty style helps, but the keys to the significance and coherence of this book
are the choice of subject and a decision to cast complex responses into a few
persistent dichotomies.
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are the choice of subject and a decision to cast complex responses into a few
persistent dichotomies.
Spenser's importance as "the poets' poet" makes a study of imitations of
his work recount a version of the history of English literature, and his
centrality as "the critics' poet" lets the evaluations and interpretations of his
poetry retell, to some degree, the course of English literary criticism
(vii-viii). Radcliffe treats both facets of the response economically and
fluidly. The result is somewhat simplifying, but the author readily concedes
"that the history of Spenser criticism can and should be told in more than
one way" (xii).
Radcliffe sees all literary history in Augustan terms: though only his
chapter on the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries is entitled
"Ancients and Moderns," he sees these polarities as defining both Renaissance
and contemporary reactions, too. Spenser himself imitates a revered past
even as he takes advantage of the modern technology of printing, and the
"attempts...to present Spenser as both a repository of traditional values and
an authority for change continue throughout much of twentieth-century
academic criticism" (155). Even recent scholarship takes an Augustan shape,
as Radcliffe calls Jonathan Goldberg's 1981 Endlesse Worke possibly "a
decadent scion of the Whig tradition, for its central concerns are freedom
and constraint" (191).
For readers of this journal, the first and second chapters may hold the
greatest interest. Radcliffe suggests Spenser's early critical success by noting
seventeenth-century imitations and epigrammatic references, then confirms
the significance of Spenser's poetry by noting his appropriation on both sides
in political and aesthetic conflicts, whether the English civil war or the great
literary debate of the following era: "For Ancients like Pope, common sense
implied the timeless and cosmopolitan ideals of classical humanism; for
Moderns like Addison, common sense implied nationalist ideals of
commerce, progress, and statehood. Both parties appealed to Spenser as an
authority for their position....[I]n the end nothing was settled but Spenser's
centrality to British poetry" (44). Fiowever, those who do best by Spenser,
like his imitator Matthew Prior and his first important editor, John Hughes,
partake of both factions.
By the mid-eighteenth century, the initial victory over Spenser's corpus
goes to the moderns, who have rejected Spenser's archaism and reclaimed his
allegory for the clarity and idealism of the philosophical essay or
philosophical poerh like Thomson's Castle of Indolence, a line that Radcliffe
sees as extending to Thomas Paine and even to the Tianamen Square Chinese
dissidents with their statues of Liberty. Such a line of descent from Spenser
counterpoises allegory, in the eighteenth century, to the "Bourbon tyranny
or gothic 'superstition'" (35). At the same time, nonetheless. The Faerie
Queene's own Gothicism is providing a model for an alternative aesthetic
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the primary exhibit for eighteenth-century critics attempting to argue that
'gothic art' was not an oxymoron" (45).
Other features of Spenserianism head in other directions. Pope purifies
Spenser's language and verse forms while emulating his pastoralism, but Pope
also, like Gay, burlesques Spenser's pastoralism. This last development,
seemingly minor, becomes in Radcliffe's view a forerunner of British
Romanticism. A major poem in this line is Shenstone's The School-Mistress,
which starts as a burlesque of Spenser, with Spenser's heightened archaic
style applied to a vulgar subject, but gradually becomes more appreciative of
Spenser and more "sentimentalized" (55). Ultimately, James Beattie's The
Minstrel; Or, The Progress of Genius (1771) with its mildly Spenserian diction
and Spenserian stanzas emerges as "probably the most influential Spenserian
poem written in the eighteenth century" (78). This is the route through
which such poems as Byron's Childe Harold or Wordsworth's "Salisbury
Plain" arrive. In other words, the early eighteenth-century poets burlesque
Spenser by introducing low topics, mid-eighteenth-century poets are half
burlesquing Spenser but warming to the objects of their burlesque, and the
romantics are spiritually misreading these burlesques to produce the subject
of the common man.
If one path of Spenserianism led to the common man, Radcliffe notes
that another led toward scholarly elitism: "Throughout the period, and
indeed down to our own time, friends and foes of Spenser alike describe the
Faerie Queene as out of fashion and accessible only to scholars" (75).
Radcliffe tries to keep the course of Spenser's reception complex but again
finds the commentary upon him heading in two different political directions.
In the nineteenth century, the Tory "throne-and-altar" view dominates (97),
yet by the late Victorian era, Radcliffe is back to his favorite dichotomies,
where James Russell Lowell's "cool, disinterested cosmopolitanism recalls
Dryden and Pope, while [Edward] Dowden's urgent didacticism derives from
the patriotic criticism of Addison, Steele, and Hughes" (135). Even
twentieth-century criticism will take Whig and Tory forms.
This pervasive Augustan view somewhat limits the scope of Radcliffe's
book: for instance, the first century of commentary upon Spenser receives
relatively brief attention (but R. M. Cummings's compilation in the Critical
Heritage series provides coverage for that period). Also, the lack of foot- or
end-notes may prove frustrating for those who wish to trace the source of
some particular point, though each chapter has its own "Works Cited" list.
Given the tendency of current scholars to specialize within periods, however.
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this Spenserian reception history provides a wonderfully coherent and
intriguing view of English literary criticism in a long perspective.

Barbara M, Benedict, Making the Modern Reader.
Cultural Mediation in Early Modern Literary Antholo
gies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Pp.
252. $39.50.
Reviewed by Laura J. Rosenthal
Florida State University
We have all run across them researching other projects: an odd collection
called Poetic Miscellanies or Miscellaneous Poems, by Several Hands or Poems
on Several Occasions or Tbe Ladies Library. Barbara M. Benedict's Making the
Modern Reader: Cultural Mediation in Early Modern Literary Anthologies for
the first time examines such books on their own terms and tracks the
emergence and transformation of a genre—the anthology—in early modern
British society. Benedict provides a groundbreaking and apparently
comprehensive study of this previously neglected genre, following its
mutations from the Elizabethan age through the late eighteenth century.
Benedict's book would be a significant contribution for this effort alone:
Making the Modem Reader provides a wealth of bibliographic information as
well as a history of this genre's change over time, demonstrating a kind of
coherence to a genre that is various by nature. Yet Benedict's goals exceed
recovery, for she also demonstrates the significance and explanatory power
of the anthology as a cultural force. While distinguishing between the
anthology's early and later manifestations, Benedict summarizes the
Restoration and eighteenth century collection with the image of the feast
invoked by the books themselves: "The feasting image celebrates the cultural
commonality of reading, the participation in a community, even while
lauding the active integrity of individual reader" (9). The feast image suggests
copiousness and variety, while at the same time representing the book as a
commodity to be consumed (10). The anthology's self-consciousness about
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its consumer orientation as well as its frequent anonymity and necessary
heterogeneity offer unique emphasis on and insight into the position of the
reader. This is the heart of Benedict's argument: "the history of the
anthology demonstrates the growing control of the self-definition of readers
by a rhetoric tuned to mass production in an increasingly anonymous
market" (29). Benefiting from Pierre Bourdieu, Peter Stallybrass, and Allon
White, Benedict demonstrates how anthologies "represent high literature for
a mass audience" (29). They gain significance from both their commodity
value and their cultural value.
The earlier anthologies accomplish this by positioning themselves as
gateways to cultural capital. By publishing the poetry created by an elite
circle at court, Restoration anthologies market to a broader audience a sense
of inclusion in a community. They represent poetry as cultural power, and
at the same time suggest to the reader that his or her very consumption of
the text signifies a refined literary taste: "By means of the anthology,
publishers promise readers that they can master high culture and, by
implication, rise in a society ideally figured as a neutral realm" (91). The
anthologies, then, serve as both technology and symptom of mobility—or at
least desire for mobility. For example, while some editors directly flatter
their readers, Jacob Tonson cleverly positions the reader as a man or woman
of taste by inviting him or her to pass aesthetic judgment by printing
different kinds of poems on the same theme or different translations of
classical works in the same book (99). With the new copyright law and the
increase in literary professionalization in the early eighteenth century,
anthologies articulate anxieties about the eroding boundaries between "cheap
and elite writing, and about the differentiation of the gentleman-author, the
professional author, and the hack" (143)—perhaps ironically, since
anthologies themselves contributed to this phenomenon. A related example
of the early eighteenth-century passion for "distinction" appears in genderspecific marketing of anthologies: feminine cultural capital emerges as
distinct from the masculine kind.
Through the middle of the century, however, anxieties proliferated over
proliferation itself: "poetry was seriously challenged as the most influential
form of high literature. Novels, periodical journals and magazines, and
collection of prose anecdotes, extracts, and vignettes were attracting multiple
readers, as well as popular, 'hack,' and 'elite' authors, or authors who
portrayed themselves as such" (153). The observation that commodity value
did not match literary value caused serious concern and emerged in debates
about copyright. Benedict interestingly suggests anthology editors, working
in some ways in an inherently suspect genre, resolved—or really, distracted
from—this ideological conflict by positioning miscellanies as patriotic
histories. The Harleian Miscellany, for example, "established for a generation
already attracted to nostalgia the idea that patriotism was manifested by a
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literate tradition, a tradition of writing regardless of genre...This ideology
helped booksellers to negotiate...the problem of seeming to profiteer from
culture" (174). This change seems to have had the effect of creating greater
uniformity in anthologies, representing "cultural education as the history of
British poetry" (209). Foregoing the heteroglossia of the Restoration
anthologies, editors marketed more consistent collections to specific social
groups: children, the pious, and most of all, the potentially cultured. We
have arrived, it appears, at the modern reader and the modern collection.
Making the Modem Reader thus contributes significantly to our
understanding of the role of reading in the formation of cultural spheres.
For me, some of the best moments in the book were the times that the
author used her research on anthologies to offer insight into other literary
forms: she points out, for example, the way that Tom Jones, with its variety
of fare, resembles an anthology and that Fielding himself describes the book
as a feast. I was hungry for more such connections, for they demonstrate
the wider significance of literary collections. Making the Modern Reader itself
offers a sumptuous repast, although sometimes the dishes overcrowd the
table. At the same time, in spite of this book's impressive attention to
nearly every form of reading in the early modern period—novels,
newspapers, poetry, conduct books, collections, essays—it scarcely mentions
plays, which were increasingly popular reading material, at all. Nevertheless,
Making the Modern Reader will itself become required reading for anyone
interested in the role of publication in the formation of cultural spheres in
the early modern period.

Kevin L. Cope, ed., Enlightening Allegory. Theory,
Practice, and Contexts of Allegory in the Late
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. New York: AMS
Press, 1993. Pp. xviii + 400. $45.00.
Reviewed by Franklin E. Liebenow, Jr.
Chicago State University
Kevin L. Cope has assembled an admirable collection of essays that employ
various critical approaches to examine, in different disciplines and historical
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settings, the theory and practice of allegory in the late seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. His preface offers a spirited commentary on a host of
critical issues that the study of Enlightenment allegory raises. He groups the
fourteen essays into three sections.
The essays comprising the initial section, "Presentations: Theories,
Speculations," are Hazard Adams's "Reynolds, Vico, Blackwell, Blake: The
Fate of Allegory"; Thomas E. Maresca's "Personification vs. Allegory";
John T. Shawcross's "Allegory, Typology, and Didacticism: Paradise Lost in
the Eighteenth Century"; Thomas A. Vogler's "The Allegory of Allegory:
Unlockeing Blake's 'Crystal Cabinet'"; Grant Holly's "The Allegory in
Realism"; and Kevin L. Cope's "Directions to Signify: Exploring the
Emblems of Enlightenment Allegory."
Thomas E. Maresca shows that present day critics and scholars have
tended to overlook or devalue allegorical practice in the late seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries because writers at the time either called allegory by
some other term or restricted it to personification. He maintains that
allegories signify meanings other than what is said, whereas personifications
always univocally mean what is said. The classification of Bunyan's The
Pilgrim's Progress as an allegory began with the author himself and was
subsequently perpetuated. Maresca persuasively argues that personification
is "the sustaining device of The Pilgrim's Progress" (25) because nothing in the
book means anything other than what is said. Since terms direct critical
attention, he offers as a starting point for the re-evaluation of Restoration
and eighteenth-century allegory a helpful classification of five senses of the
term. Although he includes the sense in which Paul de Man uses allegory,
he points out that it is "really a misnomer," referring instead "to a particular
species of irony, wherein the duplicity of language itself betrays all intention
and control" (35).
Kevin L. Cope provides a necessary corrective for the deconstructionist
celebration of allegory as the meta-trope that subverts signification.
Examining a wide array of Enlightenment maxims, emblems, and maps, he
reveals that the relationship between signifier and signified is "natural" or
congruous. In Charles Bradbury's Cabinet of Jewels (1785), the allegorical
meaning, the celestial yearning of all earthly life, derives from the activities
inherent in the descriptions of the emblematic organisms: the flight of birds,
the upward glances of beasts, the ascending flow of sap in trees. Allegories
thus compress and make meaning accessible. Robert Cillet's The Pleasures of
Reason (1796), a didactic allegory consisting of "a condensed galaxy of forms"
(208), includes maxims, personifications, and maps for instilling moral
lessons, conveying information, and teaching French to young women.
Because the signifying directions are overdetermined, allegorical
communication is accessible, repetitive, and local rather than mysterious.
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The essays comprising the middle section, "Presences: Acts, Events," are
Nanette Le Coat's "The Language of Revolution; Allegory in Volney's Les
Ruines"; Deborah Ann Jacobs's "The Plot in a Dream and Dreams of a Plot:
The Lessons of Occasional Allegory"; Connie Capers Thorson's "Allegory
in Minor Restoration Theatricals: Anti-Papist Rhetoric and Propaganda";
and Janet Wolf's "Political Allegory in the Later Plays of John Gay."
Deborah Ann Jacobs contributes to the understanding of the post-Ren
aissance or "modern" allegory with her analysis of The Plot in a Dream; or,
the discoverer in Masquerade (1681). In this work, "the text's allegory has
been made subservient to the text's didactic message" (252). Philopatris, the
pseudonym of the author and name of the protagonist, interjects commen
tary and interpretative remarks into his narrative of dreams about characters,
places, and events pertaining to the Popish Plot. The authorial directives
preclude alternative readings and unambiguously target Titus Gates, the first
Earl of Shaftesbury, the House of Commons, and radical Protestant
sectarians. According to Jacobs's careful analysis, the pre-text of the allegory
consists of the varied writings about the Popish Plot that serve to situate
readers within a context which conditions their response to the partisan
message of the work.
Janet Wolf convincingly puts to rest any doubt that John Gay's later
dramatic works abound in pointed, satirical attacks on Sir Robert Walpole.
Gay indicts Walpole by playing on allegory's quality of indirection. Wolf
demonstrates how different characters in a single play alternately serve as
Walpole avatars by enacting the themes and uttering the argot circulating
through the Opposition press.
The essays comprising the final section, "Representations: Texts, Talks,
Tales," are Neil Saccamano's "Knowledge, Power, Allegory: Swift's Tale and
Neoclassical Literary Criticism"; Dustin Griffin's "The Visionary Scene:
Vision and Allegory in the Poetry of Pope"; Veronica Kelly's '"Embody'd
dark': The Simulation of Allegory in The DunciacT-, and Peter Walmsley's
"Guardian #39-. Berkeley's Allegory of Mind."
For Neil Saccamano the allegorical Reformation narrative in Swift's Tale
of a Tub depicts the abuses of power produced by the imposition of
unwarranted meanings. Martin's "plain text" reading of his father's will
exemplifies the ethical means for gaining knowledge from written works.
Such a reading, as practiced in early Protestant biblical exegesis, entails the
recovery of the intended meaning as dictated by the grammatical, literal
sense. Because of its multivalence and ambiguity, "enigmatic" allegory was
distrusted by Augustan writers who instead "promoted an enlightened notion
of allegory based primarily on personification" as the "formal technique" for
ensuring determinacy of intention (310).
Peter Walmsley cogently shows how Berkeley discovers in allegory's
sustained separation of tenor and vehicle a congenial mode for discussing
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sensory experience. In Guardian §39, Berkeley makes satiric use of allegory
to expose Anthony Collins's atheistical intention in A Discourse of
Free-thinking (1713). In the process, Berkeley finds in allegory a rhetorical
strategy for his own philosophical discourse that, unlike metaphor,
"preserves the subordination of the sensible to the spiritual" (386).
This reviewer has only been able to comment on a few essays in an
attempt to indicate the range and diversity of a collection essential not only
for providing valuable insights into individual works, but also for advancing
the discussion of a persistent but elusive literary form in the extended
eighteenth century.

Michael Prince, Philosophical Dialogue in the British
Enlightenment Theology, Aesthetics, and the Novel.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xiv
+ 282. $54.95.
Reviewed by Scott Paul Gordon
Lehigh University
Michael Prince's Philosophical Dialogue in the British Enlightenment:
Theology, Aesthetics, and the Novel traces the collapse of confidence in
seventeenth-century British philosophy that proper reason
ing—conventionally pursued by means of the metaphysical dialogue,
authorized to lead readers dialectically from the complexity of individual
viewpoints to recognize transcendent truths—could produce consensus on
moral matters. Both Hobbesian egoism, which assumed that "the beliefs that
the reader took for truth are motivated by material self-interest" (34), and
Lockean empiricism, which implied "no inherent and consistent reality apart
from the subjective state of the observer" (80), position judgment as merely
the motivated opinions of particular, interested individuals and thereby deny
its capacity to recognize (even through dialectical reasoning) universal truths.
Indeed, in insisting that no form can ascend from competing positions to
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transcendent moral judgment, these challenges effectively disconnect
"dialogue" from the promise of "dialectic": dialogue leaves readers where
they began, lacking certain means to arbitrate between competing claims.
Such challenges, as the bulk of Prince's study shows, produced in turn a
series of attempts, formally complex, to rescue both shared ethical beliefs and
a methodology capable of establishing them.
In impressively detailed chapters on Shaftesbury and Berkeley, Prince
shows that these philosophers both "need" and sense the "impossibility of
dialogue" (46). While they desire, quite traditionally, to provoke readers to
transcend mere phenomenal variety, they cannot trust the philosophical
apparatus of dialogue that conventionally enabled transcendence of individual
positions. The complexity of Prince's readings of Shaftesbury and Berkeley
lies in his treating their texts as formal experiments to solve such philosophic
challenges; unlike other writers that Prince treats (Hume and Mandeville)
who level materialist challenges at dialectical logic's claim to the ability to
arrive at transcendent truth, Shaftesbury and Berkeley strive to rescue the
embattled genre of dialogue through fascinating formal experimentation. It
is this formal experimentation, described as a "novelization" of moral
philosophy, that justifies Prince's claim that the first "native theory of the
novel developed" in the philosophic dialogue (112). By "theory of the novel"
Prince seems to mean, mainly, a new theory of and means of depicting
"character," the issue he repeatedly invokes in early chapters to describe the
formal innovations that both challenged and attempted to rescue philosophic
writing.
Prince's consistent theoretical insistence that texts generate formal
solutions to increasingly knotty philosophic problems is this book's most
impressive and important claim: eighteenth-century philosophers increas
ingly deploy "the resources of fiction" to solve problems traditionally (but
no longer adequately) addressed by philosophic writing. Berkeley, for
instance, "manipulates the resources of fiction...to solve the [philosophic]
difficulties he addressed in...earlier work" (98); "In the simplest terms,"
Prince notes, "the inadequacy of a philosophic response to Pyrrhonism gives
rise to a fictional response" (131). In Shaftesbury's texts, too. Prince shows
that a "reconciliation occurs primarily on the level of literary form, rather
than within the polemics themselves" (69). "Form," Prince insists, "is not an
innocuous coating for content. The time-honored metaphor of the sugarcoated pill understates the reciprocal influence of the one upon the other"
(110). But even with his continual attention to the formal component of
philosophic texts. Prince never assumes such solutions work: indeed much
of Philosophical Dialogue in the British Enlightenment shows that by adopting
"fictional forms" to preserve the dialogue's desired movement from "divided
opinion to consensus," the philosopher risks disabling that very movement
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by establishing "character" and reading character as a new and problematic
site for ethical understanding.
Aesthetics remain central to this study of philosophic writing not only
because such writing increasingly deploys fictional forms (such as deep
characterization, plots of poetic justice, or satiric manipulation) to achieve
philosophic ends. Prince suggests as well that the category of the aesthetic
itself emerged to reassure eighteenth-century thinkers that the "objective
universality" of phenomenon assumed by the philosophic dialogue in its
"plot of ascent from divided opinion to consensus, from phenomena to
noumena" still existed; recognizing "the difficulty of grounding consensus
in reason," writers "looked to aesthetic experience as a new means of
guaranteeing uniformity of response." If philosophers, that is, began to
doubt that dialectical reason could produce agreement among diverse
subjects, they hoped such agreement could be found in the supposed
"uniform response to aesthetic phenomenon" (163-5).
I hope the subtlety of Prince's readings of philosophic texts and of the
cultural role of aesthetics itself is clear; his readings of traditional literary
texts satisfy less. Prince offers a convincing thesis: the eighteenth-century
novel engages in the struggle, after the collapse of dialogue, to find grounds
on which to reestablish moral truth. How to "recover a basis for ethics
from the ruin of a metaphysically grounded theology," Prince argues,
becomes "a paramount concern for novelists as different as Defoe, Fielding,
Richardson, Sterne, Johnson, Burney, and Austen" (199). The problem lies
less in this claim than in the readings that substantiate it. The discussion of
novelistic interventions into the debate at the center of this book, for
instance, occupies very few pages (a seven-page subchapter on Tristram
Shandy^ a slim chapter on Johnson and Austen), which seems inadequate
since Prince's argument repeatedly points to the emergent novel as the
culminating form in his story; indeed, Prince hints that the decline of
philosophic dialogue invented the novel. More importantly, however.
Prince's superb analytical skills, constantly demonstrating how form offers
solutions to otherwise irreconcilable philosophic problems, seem less present
in these chapters. Whereas Prince's discussion of the use of formal
experimentation makes philosophic texts more complex than they had
seemed, his more hasty discussion of literary texts tends to reduce them to
interventions into philosophic debate. This is not to say, by any means, that
positioning literary texts as participating in long-standing ethical problems
is reductive. But Prince's treatment of Johnson and Austen, while providing
a new context for Rasselas or Sense and Sensibility, fails to make these texts
deeper or more complex than they seemed before—precisely the achievement
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on nearly every other page of Michael Prince's distinguished study.

Knud Haakonssen, ed., Enlightenment and Religion:
Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Ideas in
Context 41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996. Pp. xii + 352, $59.95/jf:40.00.
Reviewed by M. A. Box
University of Alaska, Fairbanks
Editors of collections like this one must impose somehow a unity on diverse
materials to justify their publication together as a book. Haakonssen
succeeds by virtue of a tightly focused topic, a subset of a subset of a
putative English Enlightenment, not rational religion, but rational dissent,
the rational religion of nonconforming English and Irish Christians.
Rational dissenters had significant areas of agreement and tension with both
orthodox dissent and the establishment church-state polity. The picture is
complex and the lines of debate shift unexpectedly, with rational dissent
evolving out of English Presbyterianism, the dogmatism of which in the
1600s had been too much for the Independents. Milton would have been
surprised. Haakonssen imposes more unity on his contributors than perhaps
they naturally have by applying to their articles J. G. A. Pocock's distinction
between a continental, radical Enlightenment and an English, conservative
one. Haakonssen puts the articles to the question: did enlightened dissent
have more in common with the conservative Enlightenment or with the
revolutionary one that erupted on the continent.' Often however his
contributors see the comparison less in terms of the French Revolution to
come than of the English Revolution of the 1640s, and the answers to his
question are understandably mixed. Notwithstanding, the collection is so
well conceived and executed that the result is a book sure to inform most of
us concerning an aspect of intellectual history about which we ought to
know more.
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In the introduction Haakonssen surveys the state of scholarship on
rational religion in Britain, skillfully situating the following chapters within
various questions surrounding the topic. Though the emphasis is on current
scholarship, Haakonssen, as usual, seems to have read and digested
everything ever written no matter how arcane. Like Haakonssen s
introduction, the first of R. K. Webb's two chapters is a preparatory survey,
this time of the historical circumstances within which dissent proliferated.
Taking us from the Act of Uniformity of 1662 up through the mixed impact
of the French Revolution, this survey provides a helpful orientation in
advance of the historical detail work in the succeeding articles. Oddly, a
quarter of the chapter is devoted to treating Philip Doddridge's career as a
microcosm of the centrifugal and centripetal forces making dissent
continually split and reform into new combinations. The centrifugal force
was the competing impulses to fervent Calvinism and to level-headed
rationalism, the centripetal force the elusive realization that the two can be
reconciled, as they were in the person of Doddridge. As such, this discussion
would seem more apposite in Webb's second article, the thesis of which is
that rational piety is not a contradiction in terms and that a symbiosis
between rationality and piety, recognized well into the nineteenth century,
had been attained by, among others, Tillotson, John Jebb, Doddridge, and
Priestley.
M. A. Stewart's chapter on the interplay of the Anglo-Irish Establishment
with Irish and Scottish Presbyterianism also serves to determine the context
in which we should view rational dissent. The cross-pollination of Irish and
Scottish rational dissent was manifested in increased momentum in principled
opposition to credal subscription, whether to the Thirty-nine Articles of the
Established Church or the Presbyterians' Westminster Confession of Faith.
Enunciation of the "nonsubscription principle," that enforced conformity
only infuses hypocrisy into religion, brought out its premise that church and
state are meaningful only as voluntary societies formed to meet the common
goals of their members. The Scottish connection is important also for
Martin Fitzpatrick, who brings Presbyterian "moderatism" into comparison
and contrast with English rational dissent by relating the differing reactions
to contemporary affairs of two correspondents, both educated at Glasgow
University and philosophical sons of Francis Hutcheson. The American
Revolution, the Wilkite agitations, failed attempts to repeal required credal
subscription, the French Revolution, all elicit letters from the exemplars
seeming to indicate, in answer to Haakonssen's question, that English
rational dissent resembled more the radical Enlightenment and Scottish
moderatism than the conservative one. But Fitzpatrick is unwilling to be so
schematic, observing that both correspondents grew disappointed in their
respective movements' failures, whether to advance or preserve liberties.
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David L. Wykes is similarly wary of tidy formulations. Examining the
thesis that nonconforming academies were a major cause of the emergence
of rational dissent, he is admirably willing to reach an undramatic,
moderating conclusion. The causal thesis he finds simplistic is that English
"Presbyterian congregations were converted from orthodox Calvinism by
their ministers, who, having adopted heterodox opinions at the academies,
descended upon their unsuspecting congregations and proceeded to carry
them into Unitarianism" (99). Rather the academies were a factor in a larger
causal complex and were shaped by events and intellectual developments as
much as shapers of them. Their greatest contribution was the indirect one
of allowing students the right of private judgment. Another revisionist study
is John Seed's, which vigorously contradicts the view of several historians
that as a political force the rational dissenters were few, unrepresentative, and
marginal. To the contrary, behind the intellectual leadership was a cohesive
commercial elite with local and parliamentary influence greater than its
numbers would suggest.
The history of discrimination against
nonconformists made the rational dissenters into activist civil libertarians,
though decidedly not levelers. This nuanced political position reminds one
of Fitzpatrick's reluctance to characterize rational dissent as revolutionary.
The next two chapters take up how rational dissent was conditioned,
respectively, by legal and theological concerns. Wilfred Prest documents
some dissenters' penetration into the legal profession and the importance of
the law to Priestley's philosophy of civilization, concluding, cautiously, that
despite the legal disabilities of nonconformity, dissenters and the law did not
always confront each other "in attitudes of mutual antagonism" (191). A. M.
C. Waterman, on the other hand, shows in a breathtaking exercise in
analysis that the theological commitments of establishment and rational
dissent practically guaranteed a far-reaching mutual antagonism. I will not
attempt here to summarize the involved conceptual linkage whereby belief
or disbelief in the Incarnation leads circuitously to convictions favoring a
civil polity defined either by the principle of subordination or liberty. I will
only point out the apparent disagreement between Waterman's rational
dissent, which was antipathetic to subordination, and Seed's, the
libertarianism of which was antiegalitarian. Waterman's rational dissent is
closer than Seed's to the revolutionary Enlightenment. The disagreement
might dissolve with a distinction between sanctified hierarchy and secular
meritocracy.
John Gascoigne describes the cross-pollination of rational dissent with the
Established Church by retailing the rise of an antiestablishmentarian.
Unitarian movement out of Hoadleian latitudinarianism. As Bishop
Hoadley's quarrel was with credal subscription, this development
contravenes both J. C. D. Clark's thesis that the Establishment was a
"Confessional State" doctrinally unified in opposition to dissent and Jim
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Bradley's judgment that the gravamen between dissent and establishment was
over episcopacy and liturgy rather than theology. In chapter 10, Alan
Saunders takes Bradley to task for scanting theological issues, arguing that
the rational dissenters' claim to a place in the radical tradition resides in their
response to theological clashes, specifically the identification of free inquiry
and toleration as prerequisites to true religion. Their political positions are
determined by the necessity of securing the prerequisites: accordingly, "there
can be no orthodoxy, no establishment" (261). Saunders explicates this
orientation in terms of the dissenters' stress on candor, a moral concept
developed into a methodological principle facilitating the open examination
of all doctrines.
Alan Tapper also affirms the importance of theology to dissent, though
he confines himself to explicating Priestley, whom he does not see as typical.
He puts Priestley nominally within the radical tradition but finds enough
divergence from it to yield an ambiguous answer to Haakonssen's question.
One of Priestley's answers to the problem of evil, namely that adversity is
necessary to the development of virtue, leads to his defense of the civil
liberties of the industrious classes and his attack on the rule of an idle, hence
vicious aristocracy. But Priestley was less interested in cultivating "civic
virtue" through participatory democracy than in removing statist hindrances
to the exercise of civil virtue, to endeavors in commerce, industry,
agriculture, science, philosophy, and religion. Finally, in a discussion of
philosemitism complementary to Howard Weinbrot's broader treatment in
his Britannia's Issue, Iain McCalman describes the appeal to radicalism of
"restorationism," an eschatology according to which the millennium would
occur after the Jews had been restored to their former glory, in some
versions to their Palestinian homeland. Priestley's attractive restorationism
took the form of an appeal for convergence on the common ground of
"purified Christianity and enlightened Judaism" (315). McCalman follows
restorationism from its scholarly manifestations through its permutations in
the radical underworld of virtuosi and seekers and its associations with
Bonapartism.
It has seemed more helpful to convey the contents of these articles than
to applaud or criticize them: all of them are at the least highly informative,
and several of them (e.g., Seed's, Waterman's, Tapper's) are simply splendid.
The writing is always straightforward, unpretentious, and free of jargon save
for that required by theological and legal complexities. Haakonssen's collec-
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tion should find an appreciative audience among the readers of this annual.

T5V

Thomas M. Kavanagh, Esthetics of the Moment
Literature and Art in the French Enlightenment. Phil
adelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996. Pp. x
+ 294. $45.00; and John C. O'Neal, The Authority of
Experience-.
Sensationist Theory in the French
Enlightenment. University Park: Penn State Press, 1996.
Pp. xii + 284. $45.00.
Reviewed by Ronald C. Roshottom
Amherst College
These substantial studies, by accomplished historians of literature and ideas,
form the two panels of a diptych that would reveal to us the French
Enlightenment's heretofore misunderstood or under-appreciated ideological
cohesion. Both books deal with the period's attempts at defining an aesthetic
based on sensationism (that is, on social, moral, and intellectual knowledge
that comes from the body's responses to its environment). Kavanagh gives
over half of his study to the visual arts (Watteau, Chardin, Boucher,
Fragonard, and Greuze), and half to the written word (Lahontan, Diderot,
Graffigny, Rousseau, and Casanova). O'Neal focusses on Condillac, Bonnet,
and Helvetius in his outline of sensationism, and on Graffigny, Laclos and
Sade in his literary excursus. Kavanagh writes with elan and wit, tinged with
the contemporary vocabulary of cultural and historical criticism. O'Neal
writes with the self-assurance of an accomplished classroom teacher who has
had to explain distant philosophies to those not grounded in even modern
ideas. He frequently repeats his points—which sometimes grates—but he
does so for valid pedagogical reasons, for he is dealing with a vocabulary and
images that have long since disappeared from our immediate intellectual
horizons; thus his book is an informational trove for an important—a very
important—strain of Enlightenment thought. In the end, both books fall
into the almost inescapable trap of scholar-writers: they tend toward the
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myopia that comes from secure knowledge of a subject or confidence in a
unifying theory. Nevertheless, they both belong in the libraries of anyone
interested in the complexities of a period that, in the end, named itself, but
which could not define itself, and one that we have not been able to label
securely since.
John O'Neal stresses that he will not only give a history of Enlighten
ment sensationism (a term he makes an excellent argument for using), which
derived primarily from John Locke's extraordinarily influential An Essay
concerning Human Understanding (1690), but that he intends to outline an
aesthetics of sensationism, a logic of beauty that will enable us to read more
appreciatively the period's imaginative works. O'Neal succeeds in presenting
a chronologically complex story of how Locke's work was read and critiqued
by some of France's most talented philosophers. He also adroitly ties the
epistemological aspects of the works of Condillac (esp. Essai sur I origine des
connaissances humaines (1746), Traite des systemes [1749], Traite des sensations
[1754]), of Bonnet (esp. the Essai analytique sur les facultes de I'ame [1760J,
and of Helvkius {De I'esprit [1758] and De I'homme [1772]), to their cultural
and political uses. (Bonnet, by the way, is so little known that he has no
entry in the very complete 1995 edition of The New Oxford Companion to
Literature in French^ O'Neal believes, like Kavanagh, that the Enlighten
ment was an important period of transition in the early modern period, one
that sought intelligently and persistently for a world view, an ideology that
would make permanent the period's most important legacy: the demotion
of monarchical, patriarchal, and religious authority as the guarantors—and
imposers—of truth. The fact that the Enlightenment's legacy was not
unproblematic, namely, that its more positive emphases were perverted by
an aggressive political ideology in France (the Revolution and its aftermath)
and a very significant economic ideology in England (capitalism), should not,
they argue, affect our attempts to understand the ingenious and courageous
premises of that legacy, especially in the areas of education and individual
freedom.
What happened during this brief epoch is that "the pursuit of happiness"
became a dominant goal, and this is, in the end, what both O'Neal and
Kavanagh write about, though from very different discursive and
philosophical directions. Individual pleasure, confidence in individual
judgment, reliance on the body, on the "gut," to tell us what is desirable and
unpleasant for us, are the tenets, though not always the aims, of much
sensationist theory of the time. Condillac desired to find a logical system
which would reject "non-experienced abstraction;" Bonnet believed that
memory and repetition—that the body encodes what it needs and wants, that
pleasure could be learned—formed the basis of natural education, and thus
should be replicated in formal education; and Helvetius' more radical
confidence that the origin of all knowledge, even existence, was the sensible
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body: these variants on a philosophical theme had seductive, yet extensive
influence. And though they were adapted by such novelists as Laclos and
Sade and by philosophers such as d'Holbach into systems of self-indulgence,
self-supremacy, and even self-negation (in some of the materialists' more
radical proposals), they were systems that permitted, for the first time on a
wide-spread social scale, the frank, secular discussion of personal and social
satisfaction, here and now. They permitted, even encouraged, a new
temporal concept in political philosophy, namely, impatience, a characteristic
of the "pursuit of happiness" with which we are still living.
Using the metaphor of "momentariness," Kavanagh describes—perhaps
too schematically—how a new preoccupation with the individual and with
the individual's physicality—his or her body—dominantly influenced the
production of literature and painting in eighteenth-century France. The
"moment" rather than its powerful antithesis, history, had powerful effect on
not only the subjects of fiction and art, but on their very forms. In an age
that was supposed to have invented the novel, the moment was an antinarrative phenomenon, concentrating on present happiness and pleasure, and
the genre itself proved insufficient to contain the subject of the "moment,"
though it was pushed to its limits by writers seeking to de-narrativize
experience. Kavanagh seeks to attenuate our misunderstanding of, to relieve
our generally negative bias toward the ephemeral, the passing, the
impermanent. This preoccupation with the present, he argues, showed the
necessity of and thus sustained individual liberty, the freedom to act
according to one's own—virtuous—dictates. And, the writers and painters
he chooses were connected by this preoccupation;
In the case of the literary text, writers such as Graffigny and Rousseau
eloquently show that the force of the moment can be portrayed only
through its dialectical interaction with a story, real or imagined, for
which events in their devastating presentness provide the overwhelm
ing inflection. In the case of painting, the fundamentally mimetic
orientation of eighteenth-century art implied that reference be made
to characters, situations, and settings assumed to have a past and
future as well as a present. Yet, within those continuities, the artist
of the moment clearly chose to give a primary and iconoclastic
preference not to the uninterrupted confluences of present with past
and future but to the singular power of the moment as a temporality
standing outside of and defining itself against those assumed
coherencies" (7).
Kavanagh's book is built around this single thesis, and one soon learns
that every work or artist mentioned is mentioned as proof that the "esthetics
of the moment" are subtended or willfully subverted. Though Kavanagh
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goes far in trying to understand the culture that brought attention to the
"moment," and is astute in explaining the intellectual formation of those he
uses as examples, one must either accept the notion of a coincidence of
aesthetic fascination with the "moment," or else conclude that writers and
painters were much more mutually influential than we have heretofore been
able to prove. Such an imposed choice interferes with his arguments; more
attention to the network of ideas and influence that must have prevailed, if
he is correct, would have helped attenuate the tendency of readers to
question the neatness of his scheme. (This review, for reasons of space,
cannot but touch on Kavanagh's sensitive readings of the painters he finds
compatible, though my cautions about the prevalence of his "esthetics of the
moment" are no less there than with his analysis of narrative.)
Locke, Condillac, Bonnet, and Helvetius are not mentioned in Writing
the Moment, yet their presence is felt, and John O'Neal shows why in The
Authority of Experience. They provided, at least for a few decades, a new
discourse that gave thinkers the space and time to wriggle out from under
the oppressive thumb of authoritarianism, and to look for ways of
celebrating the individual. CNeal's monograph has three ends: one, to
show the striking coincidence and influence of writings on post-Lockean
sensationism; two, an analysis of the appropriation of sensationism for
moral (Sade), philosophical (d'Holbach and his co-materialists), and political
pestutt de Tracy and the ideologues)-, and, three, to argue for an aesthetics
of the novel, based on sensationism, using as his exemplar, Graiflgny's Lettres
d'une Peruvimne (1747). He provides a superb overview of the mind-body
problem, and shows how sensationism "constituted a kind of religiously
moderate midway point between Cartesian metaphysical dualism-•.and
materialist monism" (93).
These books should be read in tandem, something that will rarely happen
(unless one is asked to do so, as I was). They come from two different
traditions of scholarly endeavor, and they search for answers to the same
questions—what dominant ideology determined what the Enlightenment
would be. They coincide in a discussion of only one text, Graffigny's novel,
and one pauses to ask why. Les Lettres d'une Peruvienne has recently entered
the canon (at least the college reading-list canon) of European literature.
Thanks to the Modern Language Association's recently published edition and
translation of this short novel, it is now easily available to a wide audience.
"Discovered" about 40 years ago, primarily through the work of English
Showalter, this novel has attracted much recent critical commentary,
especially among cultural and feminist critics. It tells the story, in a firstperson epistolary format, of Zilia, a young Peruvian vestal virgin, who is
kidnapped on the eve of her marriage to Aza, Peruvian Prince, by
Frenchmen under the command of Deterville. She is taken to France,
courted assiduously by Deterville as she learns to read, write and speak
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French. In the end, betrayed by Aza, who takes to Europeanization in a
completely different manner, she remains cautious about Deterville, and
decides to retire to the country to enjoy her new adopted culture—alone, and
as mistress of her estate. The novel was written by a woman—Frangoise de
Graffigny—who had to make a living writing, since she was as unlucky in
finances as she was in love, and became a best-seller in eighteenth-century
France. Though it has some glaring narrative inconsistencies, the novel
succeeds in telling how a young woman has to unlearn one way of knowing
the world and men, in order to assume another, while, in the end, living
honestly.
Kavanagh sees this novel as an exemplum of "the epiphany of the
moment." Zilia has learned to live to the moment, to deny her history—and
a newly acquired history of French culture. She refuses to be contractually
connected to anyone who does not also believe that contracts deny freedom.
By refusing to marry her rich, young, handsome French protector, she not
only assures her independence, she confirms her happiness as someone who
will live outside of (Peruvian) history and (French) society. Though,
Kavanagh at times carries himself away on his rhetorical machine (e.g., "as
both captive and princess, as both indebted dependent yet mistress of her
estate, she transcends the contradictions of those identities with an
estheticized present that limits her existence to an utterly fulfilling experience
of the moment"[81]), this is an ingenious interpretation of the Lettres d'une
Peruvienne, but does not, in the end, convince. And this brings me to my
strongest reservation about this good book: Kavanagh tries too hard to fit
into his pre-formulation of the "moment" the malleable, yet heterogeneous
contents that we find in literature and art. It isn't that he is necessarily
wrong; rather, he tries so persistently to limit his analyses to the "momen
tary" that he forces his readers to ask the question: but what about the
"anti-moment," or the "non-momentary"? He does hint at the artificiality
(the "solipsism") of Zilia's "momentary" existence, but his interpretation
leaves one asking the question: what did Graffigny know of "momentary
esthetics"? Did she just happen on this answer to the conundrum of
freedom within history, or was she influenced by ideas that might appear in
her other works? Could Zilia's happiness, or plenitude, only be effected by
taking her out of social time, of history?
O'Neal is much more cautious when he uses Graffigny as an example,
even in the end giving reasons why this novel might be seen as an counterexample of sensationist theory. But not before he takes the model that he
has elucidated throughout and applies it to a reading of the novel. "The
plots suggested by a sensationist aesthetics inevitably entail movement,
surprise, a process of decoding, and repetition" (133). In other words, this
novel and others (though he gives no other examples) rely thematically on
certain principles—especially principles of the protagonist's education—that
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have been illustrative of sensationist philosophy. Travel (from Peru to
Europe) demands of the sensitive body constant re-evaluation of the
environment, and analysis and judgment of novelty; narrative peripeteia—or
surprises—are other means of showing how the sentient being re-engages and
reinterprets the world. The protagonist must constantly "read" his
environment, both literally and metaphorically; this effort at "untangling"
[demHer was an important verb in Condillac's vocabulary) the codes that
phenomena present to the sentient one. And, finally, there is repetition, a
key component of the educative process, one that imprints on the human
mind future automatic responses. These processes occur in this novel—and
in others—O'Neal argues, and thus can form the basis for a new aesthetic,
one that, if correct, could be applied to the visual as well as to other
narrative and poetic arts.
And though O'Neal shows how his is a biassed reading of the Lettres
d'une Peruvienne, and how Laclos and Sade in effect took the new aesthetics
and pushed it to moral limits that went far in undermining its acceptance by
others, I still would have liked to have seen an application of this theory to
other aspects of the arts (e.g., painting). And I would have liked to have
seen arguments based on something other than inference to substantiate his
conclusions. How do we know that writers—and artists—of the period were
imbued with sensationist aesthetics.^ Did they write about it, talk about it,
mention it in prefaces, or what? How do we know, other than that Voltaire
and others had popularized Lockean sensationism, that the French thinkers
of the period were the ones to whom the writers (and artists) turned when
filling themselves with these new ideas?
Both Kavanagh and O'Neal argue for a new look at one of the most
critical, yet little understood moments in the history of modern cognitive
and aesthetic theory. They tread confidently ground dismissively trod by
their predecessors, and they both succeed in encouraging us to realize that
the failure of an idea to dominate in a struggle of ideologies does not mean
that the idea had insignificant or transient influence. What they both decline
to tell us is why their books are necessary. We know that sensationism and
"momentarism" have been relegated to a sidetrack in the history of ideas, but
we need to know, with the same intelligent precision they use in their
arguments, why.
In the end, then, these two first-rate studies have the characteristic that
many ambitious theories have—they mitigate contradiction in order to prove
their points. This is what makes them rich matter for conversation, for
teaching in class to bright students, for debating at annual meetings filled
with wary colleagues, and for arguing with in print. They challenge us to
see the Enlightenment, to "feel" the Enlightenment differently, to reconsider
intelligently responses to aesthetic theories that have for too long been
relegated to positivism's dustbin. And they make us return with new eyes
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to the imaginary works of a period that created the ethos from which we
still draw, while groping for answers to questions of value and liberty.

The Correspondence of Thomas Warton, edited by David
Fairer. Athens, London: University of Georgia Press,
1995. Pp. 775.
Reviewed by David Hill Radcliffe
Virginia Tech University
Samuel Johnson wrote to Thomas Warton: "You have shown to all who
shall hereafter attempt the study of our ancient authours the way to success,
by directing them to the perusal of the books which those authours had
read. Of this method Qohn] Hughes and Men much greater than Hughes
seem never to have thought. The reason why the authours which are yet
read of the sixteenth Century are so little understood is that they are read
alone, and no help is borrowed from those who lived with them or before
them" (27-8). And not only this: by interpreting Spenser in the context of
manners, cultural beliefs, and the fine arts, Warton's Observations on the
Fairy Queen established the basis for English studies as we know it today.
This is not generally recognized because the philological mill he helped to
create has tended to emphasize contexts over originality. Appearing in
criticism as a source, a fore-runner, or an analogue, Warton is often cited,
but is seldom read, discussed, or analyzed. Like his correspondent Thomas
Percy, he was a major figure latterly demoted to context.
If this is less than fair, neither is it entirely unjust. Warton's own literary
output was substantial but also imperfect: he never completed the
companion volume on Spenser's minor poetry or the second volume of his
Milton edition; the History of English Poetry leaves off at just the point
where it might have been most instructive. Much of Warton's criticism
remains untranslated and unprinted; the poems, editions, biographies,
histories, essays and ephemera that he did print are not available in modern
editions. The Warton corpus resembles nothing so much as one of the
fabulous gothic structures he so admired: a grand pile of shattered arcades.
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towering vaults, secret passages, and leering gargoyles. For two centuries bits
and pieces of it have been carried off for use in other people's writings. His
achievement was to set an example for others to improve upon. Warton was
a fine minor poet who never managed an enduring anthology piece, an
influential tastemaker who left no memorable critical statements. He set
new standards in literary scholarship which were soon superseded by the
higher standards of Ritson and Malone. With his brother Joseph, he inspired
a notable school of poetry in Headley, Russell, Bampffyld, and Bowles,
which in turn inspired a yet more notable school in Southey, Coleridge,
Lamb, and Wordsworth. Given the fact that Warton's historical importance
largely resides in his relationship to others, his correspondence is plainly of
interest.
Reconstructing a correspondence is a very Wartonian sort of project, a
matter of assembling, ordering, and commenting on fragments that demands
a thorough grounding in details, ephemera and detritus, the patience to wade
through hundreds of volumes and the imagination required to fill in the gaps
and fissures. One of the pleasures of David Fairer's new edition of the
Correspondence is observing a parallel process as Warton excavates poetry and
Fairer excavates Warton: both proceed by "the perusal of the books which
those authours had read." The scattered materials they work with,
sometimes in print, sometimes in manuscript, call forth similar labors in
establishing canon, chronology, and context. Through the correspondence
one can reconstruct the early history of English romanticism even as Warton
himself reconstructs the early history of English literature.
Letters are among the most vulnerable of literary kinds. After Warton's
death his papers were boxed and sent to Winchester College, beginning a
process of collection and dispersal, loss and recovery. Joseph Warton culled
a sample labeled "A Literary Correspondence Between Eminent Persons."
Joseph's impecunious son John then sold a select bundle to John Wooll, who
published seventy letters in Biographical Memoirs of the Late Revd. Joseph
Warton (1806). Wooll destroyed the letters he printed and choice letters
were likely lost when a.second volume failed to appear. Others were printed
and destroyed by Bishop Mant in editing Thomas Warton's Poetical Works
for the Oxford University Press in 1802. In 1825 John Warton's widow sent
over 270 items to James Ingram, president of Trinity College, who sold them
to John Murray for £100. This gave financial relief to the family, though the
letters went unpublished and were eventually donated to the British Library
in 1931. Ingram purchased a second parcel from the family, which became
the nucleus of the Bodleian Library collection of almost a hundred
notebooks, letters, and papers by the Warton brothers. John Nichols
collected Warton letters for his Anecdotes and Illustrations, since dispersed.
Another body of Warton material was gathered at Winchester College.
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Correspondence with Joseph's daughter Charlotte migrated to Texas before
being donated to Trinity College in 1973.
What remains.' Here are 609 letters, 288 written by Thomas Warton and
321 addressed to him. This is comparable to what remains for Shenstone
and Gray, though far less than the 5000 surviving letters from Warton's
successor Laureate, Robert Southey. Warton apparently did not enjoy
corresponding; had his letters been better than they are, doubtless there
would have been a collected edition long ago. Isaac D'Israeli, evaluating
their sales potential for John Murray, gave what seems a fairly just estimate
which Fairer reprints:
I take this opportunity of returning the Warton letters—I have read
every one, and every scrap—As literary Letters there is perhaps one
third, interesting—some much so...Letters purely on literary concerns,
without reference to subjects of a more popular kind, politics, le
grand Monde, Walpolian chit-chat, witty and piquant—must have a
limited sale—the best letters in this Collection refer to Thomas
Warton's History of English poetry—& there are many letters from
Warburton, Malone, & Steevens—They have been marked by
Warton—& probably made use of in his corrections & addenda to his
Volumes as they appeared—All these however are good. If it were
possible to purchase them at the price of £50—1 do not know that
they are worth £100—and select from your other Collection the
best—and accompany them by notes—such a publication might forni
a collection of literary letters which we have not yet had. To these
might be added some very Excellent ones at the Museum...if published
alone [this collection] will have a very contracted demand—but as a
basis for a large literary Correspondence with a lively commentary
often necessary to revive what is forgotten &c. &c. &c. I think
would give it a more general and quickening interest, (xxxviii)
Murray deferred and then abandoned the project. While the letters are
hardly those of a Gray or a Walpole, they do form a collection the likes of
which we have not yet had. The closest approximation is the Percy letters,
though David Fairer improves on that model by integrating all the
correspondents in a single sequence. The result amounts to a joint
biography of English studies, documenting its transformation from an affair
of private taste and antiquarian curiosity to a matter of public and
professional concern.
This was accomplished by a small group of individuals for whom letterwriting was a primary mode of communication. Thomas Warton's social
range was comprehensive: he moved (uneasily) in circles extending from
Oxford watermen to grandees in Whitehall. His style varies between private
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jesting to grand public pronouncements: letters to his brother are warm and
direct, those to his sister are guilty and impersonal; those to his niece are
friendly and familiar; those to Johnson are both friendly and formal. Most
are business-like; the unbuttoned privacy one associates with the age of
sensibility or, for that matter, the humor one associates with Warton make
but fleeting appearances. Accustomed to seeing "Tom Warton" treated with
condescension by romantics sniffing at his poetry and philologists finding
fault with his scholarship, one is surprised at the respect he commanded
from Johnson and Percy, Warburton and Hurd, Steevens and Malone. They
plainly regarded Warton's work as something not to be jested with.
Struggling with the Dictionary, Johnson expresses concern lest Warton's
college responsibilities interfere with his research on Spenser: "I would not
have it delayed. Three hours a day stolen from sleep and amusement will
produce it, let a servitour transcribe the quotations and interleave them with
references to save time" (30). The letters show Warton diligently pursuing
the interests of students (or their families) and fulfilling onerous responsibili
ties to college, university, and the Oxford University Press.
The letters and their replies often display a disjunction of sense and
sensibility: Warton, who id not write Iherary letters, soberly pursues
names and dates while his interlocutors display the manners and characters
that made them famous. We observe the hardships confronting scholars in
the days before travel grants and microforms: enormous energy went into
finding and transcribing uncatalogued materials; one gasps at rare or even
unique books and manuscripts being lent and sometimes lost. Much was in
private hands and college libraries, also being private property, could be
equally difficult to penetrate. Epistolary skills of a high order were required
to establish the trust and maintain the accuracy necessary to keep the texts
circulating. At least part of Warton's reticence must have stemmed from
reasons of prudence, for he had rivals and enemies. The letters have little to
say about politics, though sometimes one can read between the lines.
Warton evidently didn't care much for fellow Spenserian William Thompson
of Queen's College, an unsuccessful candidate for the poetry professorship
in 1751. This probably resulted from Thompson's active pursuit of Whig
patronage. Warton, who had broken with William Huggins over a 1755
translation of Ariosto, seems piqued that it was on order at Prince's
bookshop: "The Ariosto is expected by D. Prince on Saturday night; it
being ordered for Queen's library. Where is the connection.' I am thinking
that Thomson, who, you know, is a dabbler in Italian, has recommended it;
I mean proposed the buying it" (42-3). Thompson did not flourish at Tory
Oxford; he failed to win promotion and eventually died in obscurity.
Warton was more successful because he was a team player. He disowned
his pacifist Eclogues (1745) and ably defended Oxford against William
Mason's charge of infidelity in The Triumph of Isis (1749). With the accession
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of George III he was able to make a common cause with the government, a
matter of some consequence to the university. This is signaled in the grand
collections of academic verse Warton edited as Poetry Professor. Bishop
Warburton supported him for the Regius Professorship of History. The
successful candidate, John Vivian, pursued the office as a sinecure while
Warburton put forward Thomas Warton in the interest of reform; "A
recommendation of a true Scholar for a station of literature to the man who
at this juncture disposes of all is surely not forreign to my station. And I
think I am in order, when I take upon me to recommend so distinguished
a Character to the first minister. I never asked of them any thing for my
selfe. But you are not the first of this rare class of men whom I have
recommended to a powerfull Minister, who pretended to seek after merit,
tho' with no better success, than I am afraid this will prove" (226). Warton
did not seek preferment in the Church; he was a professional scholar. If the
financial plums consistently eluded him, he was already a considerable figure
when Joshua Reynolds succeeded in getting him appointed laureate in 1785.
Warton brought dignity to the office, though the office brought ridicule
upon him. Here is Thomas drafting the Laureate Ode for 1787 in a letter
to Joseph: "and now he celebrates such kings as encourage works of peace,
who patronise commerce and the arts &c. who love to visit seats of
learning. To such kings, who if they happen to be attacked by a traitor even
in the slightest way, receive the prayers and congratulations of their people,
he now addresses his panegyric" (572). Warton really believed in these
mutual responsibilities, articulating them with a personal fervor not seen
since Spenser's time.
His efforts at pindaric patriotism resulted in Probationary Odes for the
Laureateship, which describe the Oxford professor's pursuit of sublimity in
a balloon: "My provisions principally consisted of a small pot of stewed
prunes, and half of a plain diet-bread cake, both prepared and kindly
presented to me by the same ingenious hand which had fabricated the
Balloon.—I had also a small subsidiary stock, viz. a loaf of Sandwiches, three
bottles of old ale, a pint of brandy, a sallad ready mixed, a roll of collar'd
eel, a cold goose, six damson tartlets, a few china oranges, and a roasted pig
of the Chinese breed; together with a small light barometer, and proper
store of writing utensils, but no note, memorandum, nor loose hint of any
kind. So help me Cod ! " In the event, the ballast has to be tossed from the
over-freighted ship: "my own History of Poetry, my late edition of Milton's
Minora, my Miscellaneous Verses, Odes, Sonnets, Elegies, Inscriptions,
Monodies, and Complaints; my Observations on Spenser, the King's last
Speech, and Lord Mountmorres's pamphlet on the Irish Resolutions." The
Laureate enjoyed the joke, but the character stuck.
Warton constantly exercised the diplomacy required by the patronage
system, as when his friend from the press, William Julius Mickle, had a play
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rejected by David Garrick, or when Jonathan Toup, his collaborator on
Theocritus, committed an egregious blunder in propriety. Bishop Lowth
called Warton on the carpet for mentioning homosexuality in the context of
the Gospels and Toup reviled Lowth for calling attention to it. For his part,
Warton needed to stay on good terms with both Lowth and Warburton,
who hated each other heartily. Potential donors required coddling, and
several letters are devoted to extracting rent from a local peer who was a
tenant of the university. So diplomatic is the correspondence that the
previously unpublished and delightfully nasty letters of George Steevens to
Warton come as welcome relief. Warton was one of the very few on
Steevens's good side (they shared a roguish delight in misattribution);
Steevens was able to push him into the acrid controversy surrounding
Chatterton's Rowley poems. At times Warton must have struggled to
maintain his professorial demeanor, as when he attempts to answer Ritson's
attacks on the History of English Poetry with facts rather than wit.
Much as literary history made great strides in Warton's time, so has the
work of editing literary correspondence in ours. David Fairer has learned
from his predecessors among scholarly editors and sets a high standard.
Warton's correspondence ranges over much of ancient and modern literature,
and assumes a knowledge not only of obscure writers and dead languages,
but of academic and political customs—institutions that have long since
disappeared. This edition brings the necessary information to bear in a way
that leaves its texts clear and legible. The apparatus is admirably done, easy
to understand and fully explained. The introduction offers a fine
appreciation of Warton and the notes are succinct and helpful. I imagine
that this volume, like Warton's other writings, will be used primarily as a
source for notes and quotations. Thanks largely to Fairer's diligence in
investigating "the books which those authours had read," Warton's historical
context is illuminated as never before.

